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In both Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, government briefs asserted that there is a
"long-established presumption " that treaties do not
create judicially-enforceable individual rights. In his
dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Breyer challenged
this claim. The debate about whether the Supreme
Court should adopt such a presumption is part of a
broader conflict between the "nationalist" and
"'transnationalist " models of treaty enforcement. The
transnationalist model applies a presumption in Jctvor
of domestic judicial remedies for violations of treaty-
based individual rights. In contrast, the nationalist
model applies a presumption against individual reme-
dies for treaty violations. This article analyzes the
historicalfoundations of both models. It demonstrates
that doctrines involving the domestic judicial en-
forcement of treaties have changed dramatically in the
past thirty years. Between 1789 and 1975, there was
not a single judicial decision endorsing the nationalist
presumption against private enforcement of treaty
rights. In contrast, there were dozens of Supreme
Court decisions that applied the transnationalist pre-
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sumption in favor of domestic judicial remedies. Al-
though the nationalist presumption against individual
enforcement of treaties has gained widespread accep-
tance in the lower courts in the past thirty years, the
Supreme Court has never endorsed that presumption.
The Court's decisions in Hamdan and Sanchez-
Llamas declined to endorse either the nationalist or
transnationalist presumption, but the Court's ultimate
resolution of the conflict between the nationalist and
transnationalist models will have significant implica-
tions for U.S. foreign relations, separation of powers,
and the rule of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In both Hamdan v. Rumsfeld' and Sanchez-Llamas v. Ore-
gon,2 the government urged the Supreme Court to adopt the "long-
established presumption that treaties and other international agree-
ments do not create judicially enforceable individual rights."'3 One
problem with the government's argument, as Justice Breyer noted in
his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, "is that no such presumption exists."4
Although lower federal courts first adopted a presumption against ju-
dicial enforcement of treaties in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has
never adopted that presumption. The Supreme Court dodged the is-
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
3. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11,
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566), 2006 WL
271823 [hereinafter Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief]. See also Brief for Respondents at 30,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875 [hereinafter
Gov't Hamdan Brief] ("The long-established presumption is that treaties and other
international agreements do not create judicially enforceable rights.").
4. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[45:20
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sue in both Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas, neither endorsing nor re-
jecting the proposed presumption against individual enforcement of
treaties. Even so, given the volume of treaty litigation in U.S. courts
today, and given the government's persistent advocacy in support of
a presumption that treaties do not create individually enforceable
rights, the Court is likely to confront the issue again soon.
The debate about whether the Supreme Court should adopt a
presumption that treaties do not create individually enforceable rights
is part of a broader conflict between the "nationalist" and "transna-
tionalist" models of treaty enforcement. 5 The two models diverge in
two critical respects. First, they adopt conflicting approaches to
questions of treaty interpretation and primary individual rights. The
transnationalist model applies the twin canons of good faith and lib-
eral interpretation. The liberal interpretation canon-which states
that "treaties should be liberally interpreted with a view to protecting
the citizens of the respective countries in rights thereby secured ' 6-
creates a presumption in favor of an expansive view of primary indi-
vidual rights. In contrast, the nationalist model applies the canon of
deference to the executive branch. That canon states: "Although not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the gov-
ernment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
entitled to great weight." 7 On its face, the canon of deference to the
executive branch says nothing about the scope of primary individual
rights under treaties. In practice, however, deference to the executive
usually leads courts to adopt a restrictive view of the scope of treaty-
based individual rights.
The nationalist and transnationalist models also apply con-
flicting approaches to questions involving domestic remedies for
treaty violations. Whereas issues involving treaty-based primary
rights are properly viewed as treaty interpretation questions, which
are governed mainly by international law, issues involving domestic
judicial remedies for treaty violations are governed chiefly by princi-
ples of domestic remedial law. Here, the transnationalist model ap-
plies a presumption in favor of domestic judicial remedies for viola-
tions of treaty-based individual rights. 8  This presumption is
5. Dean Harold Koh has suggested a similar usage of the terms "nationalist" and
"transnationalist." See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 1479, 1513-14 (2003). However, this article introduces a novel presentation of the two
models.
6. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 581 (1908).
7. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
8. This article uses the terms "individual treaty rights" and "treaty-based individual
rights" to refer to primary rights, not remedial rights. On the distinction between primary
2006]
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expressed in the traditional maxim "that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy ...whenever that right is invaded." 9
While it recognizes exceptions to this principle, the transnationalist
model asserts that in cases where a court has jurisdiction, the court
does not need express authorization from the political branches to
provide judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights,
because it is the judiciary's responsibility within our system of di-
vided government to supply the remedy for violations of treaty-based
individual rights.' 0
In contrast, the nationalist model applies a presumption
against domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations. Under this
model of treaty enforcement, courts lack authority to provide reme-
dies for violations of individual treaty rights unless the treaty itself
creates a private right of action, or Congress has enacted legislation
authorizing private enforcement of the treaty in domestic courts.1"
Courts applying the nationalist presumption against private enforce-
ment generally dodge the question whether the treaty at issue creates
primary individual rights, and decide the case on the ground that in-
dividuals are not empowered to enforce the treaty in domestic courts.
The D.C. Circuit applied the nationalist presumption against judicial
remedies in Hamdan,12 as did the Oregon Supreme Court in Sanchez-
Llamas. 13
Defenders of the nationalist and transnationalist models em-
phasize different normative arguments. Nationalists emphasize the
importance of minimizing constraints on the President's flexibility in
implementing foreign policy. A broad view of primary individual
rights under treaties, as expressed in the canon of liberal interpreta-
tion, leads to increased constraints on the executive branch: the
rights and remedial rights, see infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23).
10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) ("Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning
and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered
as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all
other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations.").
11. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) ("Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has access to courts for
enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it
expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.").
12. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[T]his country has
traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they do not create judicially
enforceable individual rights.").
13. State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005) (interpreting past precedent
to mean that there is "a presumption against the creation of individual, judicially enforceable
rights" by means of treaties) (emphasis in original).
[45:20
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broader the scope of individual rights, the greater the restrictions on
the exercise of governmental powers. Hence, nationalists counter the
canon of liberal interpretation with the canon of deference to the ex-
ecutive branch.14 Similarly, from a nationalist perspective, the trans-
nationalist presumption in favor of judicial enforcement of treaty-
based individual rights inevitably results in judicial interference with
Presidential discretion in choosing how best to implement treaties. In
contrast, the nationalist presumption against judicial enforcement of
treaties maximizes executive discretion by minimizing the opportuni-
ties for judicial involvement in treaty-related questions.' 5
Whereas nationalists emphasize the importance of Presiden-
tial discretion, transnationalists emphasize two competing values:
harmonious foreign relations in the international sphere and the rule
of law in the domestic sphere. Transnationalists endorse the twin
canons of good faith and liberal interpretation because judicial appli-
cation of these canons helps promote amicable relations with U.S.
treaty partners. 16 In contrast, judicial deference to the executive
branch frequently results in judicial decisions that generate friction
with U.S. treaty partners. Moreover, transnationalists note that appli-
cation of the presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties en-
courages judges to turn a blind eye to ongoing violations of U.S.
treaty obligations by federal, state, and local government officers.
Insofar as treaties have the status of supreme federal law in the U.S.
constitutional system,17 judicial inaction in the face of ongoing treaty
violations by government officers is incompatible with fundamental
rule of law values. Furthermore, persistent judicial refusal to provide
remedies for foreign nationals harmed by U.S. treaty violations also
generates friction with U.S. treaty partners.
Analysis of the normative arguments for and against the na-
14. See John C. Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001) [hereinafter
Yoo, Politics as Law] (contending that the power to interpret treaties is an executive power,
and that the judiciary is therefore required to defer to the views of the executive branch on
treaty interpretation issues); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty Interpretation and the False
Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Rejoinder] (same).
15. See John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2218, 2248 (1999) ("By
refusing to enforce treaties ... the courts can avoid the difficult policy questions inherent in
determining how best to execute the nation's international obligations.").
16. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and
a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1932-36 (2005) (noting that judicial application
of the canons of good faith and liberal interpretation helps promote amicable international
relations by minimizing treaty violations).
17. U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2 (stipulating that treaties are the "supreme Law of the
Land").
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tionalist and transnationalist models merits a separate article. In con-
trast, the focus of this article is primarily historical. Proponents of
both the nationalist and transnationalist models advance historical ar-
guments in support of their respective positions. History may not be
decisive in resolving the conflict between the two models, but it
likely will be important.
The historical analysis herein is the first phase of a larger pro-
ject to trace the history of judicial enforcement of treaties in U.S.
courts from 1789 to the present. This article presents a comprehen-
sive analysis of Supreme Court decisions in treaty cases during the
first fifty years of U.S. constitutional history, from 1789 to 1838. It
then presents a brief sketch of developments since 1838. The bulk of
the analysis is devoted to issues involving domestic remedies for
treaty violations, an area that has received very little scholarly atten-
tion. 18 In contrast, discussion of issues involving treaty interpretation
and primary rights is much less detailed, largely because other schol-
ars have analyzed these issues in great depth. 19 This article adds to
the already extensive literature on treaty interpretation by linking it to
18. The doctrine of self-executing treaties has been the subject of extensive scholarly
commentary. See especially Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship,
Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2095 (1999); Jordan J. Paust, SelfExecuting Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); David
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vazquez, Four Doctrines]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter, Vazquez, Laughing];
John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Yoo, supra note 15. Although the
self-execution literature touches upon questions involving individual enforcement of treaty
rights in domestic courts, most of the articles cited above focus on the distinct but related
question of the status of treaties as law in the U.S. constitutional system. The last major
article to focus on individual enforcement of treaty rights, apart from the self-execution
question, was written almost fifteen years ago. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies ofIndividuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-114 (1992) [hereinafter
Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights]. The present article is the first to trace the historical
evolution of judicial doctrine related to individual enforcement of treaty rights.
19. See especially David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as
Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439 (1999) [hereinafter Bederman, Deference or
Deception]; David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 953 (1994) [hereinafter Bederman, Revivalist Canons]; Alex Glashausser, Difference
and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25 (2005); Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998); Michael P. Van Alstine, The
Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263 (2002) [hereinafter Van
Alstine, Treaty Delegation]; Van Alstine, supra note 16; Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note
14; Yoo, Rejoinder, supra note 14; Robert M. Chesney, Unraveling Deference: Hamdan,
the Judicial Power, and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2006-07), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=931997. See also David Sloss, Judicial
Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, N.Y.U.
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. (forthcoming 2006-07).
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questions of domestic judicial remedies and to the broader conflict
between the nationalist and transnationalist models.
The historical analysis in this article says very little about why
certain doctrinal changes have occurred; that is a subject for future
work. Instead, the main goal here is to show when key changes oc-
curred. Readers may be surprised to learn that doctrines involving
the domestic judicial enforcement of treaties have changed dramati-
cally in the past thirty years. If one surveyed judicial decisions from
1789 to 1975, one could not find a single decision endorsing the na-
tionalist presumption against individual enforcement of treaty rights.
In contrast, one could find dozens of Supreme Court decisions that
applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of individual en-
forcement of treaty-based primary rights.20 Thus, the government's
claim that there is "a long-established presumption that treaties...
do not create judicially enforceable individual rights" 2' is utterly
false. Moreover, although the nationalist presumption against indi-
vidual enforcement of treaties has gained widespread acceptance in
the lower courts in the past two decades, the Supreme Court has
never endorsed that presumption.
This article is divided into four parts. Part Two provides a
conceptual overview of the distinction between the nationalist and
transnationalist models. Part Three analyzes the Supreme Court de-
cisions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, as
they relate to the conflict between the nationalist and transnationalist
models. The Court resolved both cases in a manner that dodged the
question whether there is a presumption for or against judicial en-
forcement of individual treaty rights. Analysis of the individual
opinions in the two cases suggests that the Court is deeply divided on
the issue of judicial remedies for treaty violations. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer apparently support the transnationalist
presumption in favor of individual remedies for treaty violations.
Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
seem to prefer the nationalist presumption against domestic judicial
remedies. In the next case where this issue is squarely presented,
Justice Kennedy is likely to be the decisive swing vote.
Since the conflict between the nationalist and transnationalist
models will not disappear, and since the Court's understanding of
history will likely influence its resolution of that conflict, Parts Four
20. See infra notes 166-265, 396-424 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which the Supreme Court applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies).
21. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
2006]
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and Five analyze the historical foundations of the nationalist and
transnationalist models. Part Four presents a comprehensive analysis
of Supreme Court decisions during the first fifty years of U.S. consti-
tutional history in cases where an individual litigant raised a claim or
defense on the basis of a treaty. There were fifty-eight such cases al-
together. The analysis demonstrates that, during this period, the Su-
preme Court consistently applied the transnationalist presumption in
favor of judicial remedies for violations of individual treaty rights; it
never applied the nationalist presumption against judicial enforce-
ment of treaties. This conclusion is significant for two reasons.
First, for those who believe that courts should decide cases in accor-
dance with the original understanding, the analysis provides evidence
that the Founders understood the judicial role in treaty enforcement
in accordance with the transnationalist model, not the nationalist
model. 22 Second, for those who value judicial precedent over origi-
nal intent, it documents the "front end" of a two-hundred year tradi-
tion in which the Supreme Court has consistently applied the transna-
tionalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies.
Part Five briefly sketches doctrinal developments since 1838.
Professor Edward White has demonstrated that there was a dramatic
transformation in the constitutional regime of foreign relations in the
period between the two World Wars, which consolidated foreign re-
lations power in the federal executive branch at the expense of other
constitutional actors. 23 Part Five shows that there has been a further
transformation of foreign affairs law in the post-World-War-II era.
In the years since World War II, the nationalist approach to treaty in-
terpretation has largely supplanted the transnationalist approach; this
trend increases the concentration of foreign affairs power in the ex-
ecutive branch. However, with respect to domestic judicial remedies,
the transnationalist model retains its vitality. The Supreme Court has
never endorsed the nationalist presumption against private enforce-
ment of treaties. Rather, that presumption emerged from a set of fed-
eral circuit court decisions in the period from 1976 to 1984.
22. The author does not claim that the analysis of Supreme Court decisions in the first
fifty years of constitutional history provides conclusive proof of the Framers' original
understanding. Nevertheless, the analysis is instructive because it shows a consistent pattern
of judicial decision-making that conforms to the transnationalist model. That consistent
pattern reinforces the conclusions that other scholars have reached by examining Founding-
era sources. See Flaherty, supra note 18, at 2118-19 (contending that the Framers included
treaties in the Supremacy Clause to ensure that courts would enforce U.S. treaty
obligations); Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 18, at 1101-10 (contending the
same).
23. G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1 (1999).
[45:20
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II. Two MODELS OF TREATY ENFORCEMENT: NATIONALISM VS.
TRANSNATIONALISM
This article documents the dominance of the transnationalist
model in the early nineteenth century, and the rise of the nationalist
model in the second half of the twentieth century. To lay the
groundwork for that historical analysis, Part Two provides an over-
view of the conceptual distinction between the nationalist and trans-
nationalist models. The first section discusses the relationship be-
tween primary law and remedial law. The second section compares
nationalist and transnationalist approaches to questions of treaty in-
terpretation and primary rights. The final section explains how the
two models diverge in their approach to questions involving domestic
remedies for treaty violations.
A. Primary Rights and Judicial Remedies
A primary legal rule specifies what the lawmaker "expects or
hopes to happen when the arrangement works successfully. '24 A re-
medial rule, in contrast, "directs that a certain consequence, or sanc-
tion, may or shall follow upon an acknowledgment or formal official
determination of noncompliance with the relevant primary provi-
sion."'25 According to Hart and Sacks, the concept of a primary duty
is "the central conception of regulatory law."'26 A primary duty is "an
authoritatively recognized obligation ... not to do something, or to
do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way."'27
A primary right "is the mere obverse of the duty. ' 28 Thus, an
individual has a primary right under a treaty if the treaty imposes a
duty on the state party "not to do something" to that individual, "or to
do it" for that individual, "or to do it if at all only in a prescribed
way." For the purposes of this article, therefore, a treaty "protects
individual rights," or "creates individual rights," if an individual has
a primary right under the treaty. Treaties frequently create or protect
individual rights. Under the transnationalist model, treaty provisions
that protect individual rights are generally judicially enforceable, re-
gardless of whether the treaty creates an express private right of ac-
24. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122 (1994) [hereinafter HART & SACKS].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 130.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 29 2006-2007
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
tion.
Whereas legal rules that create or protect individual rights are
primary legal rules, legal provisions that create private rights of ac-
tion are remedial legal rules. A private right of action, according to
Hart and Sacks, "is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a [court]...
upon a disputed question about the application of [primary rules] and
to secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate offi-
cial remedy. ' '29 Treaties rarely create express private rights of ac-
tion.30 Under the nationalist model, a treaty that does not create an
express private right of action is generally not judicially enforceable,
even if the treaty protects individual rights.
Since Hart and Sacks wrote their classic treatise, the term
"private right of action" has acquired a slightly different meaning. In
contemporary usage, lawyers and judges say that a statute, for exam-
ple, creates a private right of action if it grants an individual plaintiff
a right of access to court. Under this definition, a defendant does not
need a right of action because a defendant has been haled into court
against his will. In contrast to this usage, which prevails in the statu-
tory context, some courts in recent treaty cases have insisted that a
defendant cannot obtain a remedy for a treaty violation unless the
treaty creates a private right of action. 31 This usage of the term is
consistent with the Hart and Sacks definition, which defines a private
right of action in terms of the individual's power to invoke a treaty
(or other law) before a court, rather than an individual's right of ac-
cess to court. For the purposes of this article, a treaty creates a pri-
vate right of action if it grants an individual a right of access to do-
mestic court or it empowers the individual to invoke the treaty before
that court.32 The term "private cause of action" is used interchangea-
bly with the term "private right of action. '33 Where appropriate, the
article will distinguish between a "right of access" and a "power to
invoke." Throughout the article, the terms "private right of action"
29. Id.
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 907 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("International agreements, even those
directly benefiting private persons, generally do not. . . provide for a private cause of action
in domestic courts .... ").
31. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-76 (Or. 2005).
32. Some modem treaties expressly authorize individuals to invoke the treaty before an
international tribunal. Such treaty provisions would satisfy Hart and Sacks' definition of a
private right of action. Since this article focuses on judicial enforcement of treaties in
domestic courts, though, this article defines the term "private right of action" with respect to
domestic courts, not international tribunals.
33. In some cases, lawyers and judges use the term "cause of action" to refer to
primary law rather than remedial law. In this article, though, the term "private cause of
action" refers to a remedial right, not a primary right.
[45:20
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and "power to invoke" refer to the individual's power to invoke a
treaty before a court, not the court's power to enforce the treaty on
behalf of an individual.34
B. Treaty Interpretation and Primary Rights
To determine whether a treaty creates "individually enforce-
able rights," a court must address, explicitly or implicitly, three dis-
tinct questions: (1) Does the treaty have the status of domestic law in
the United States? (2) Does the treaty create primary individual
rights? (3) Does the individual litigant have a right of action to en-
force his treaty-based primary rights? The first question is a question
of domestic constitutional law that the author has analyzed in detail
elsewhere. 35 Unless otherwise specified, this article assumes that all
treaties under consideration have the status of domestic law in the
United States.
This article focuses mainly on the third question: When do
individuals have a right of action to obtain domestic judicial remedies
for treaty violations? Even so, it is necessary to discuss briefly the
methodology that courts utilize to determine whether an individual
has a primary right under a treaty. In cases where a treaty does not
create an express private right of action (which is the norm), courts
have historically looked to domestic statutory and common law to
supply the right of action to enforce treaty-based primary rights. 36
Thus, if a treaty does not create an express private right of action, the
question of individual rights of action for treaty violations is gov-
erned principally by domestic remedial law. In contrast, the question
whether an individual has a primary right under a treaty is a question
of treaty interpretation. There is no domestic statutory or common
law that a court could consult to answer that question, so the court
must analyze the treaty itself to determine whether it creates primary
individual rights. In short, whereas questions concerning rights of
action are governed largely by domestic remedial law, the question
whether a treaty creates primary individual rights is properly viewed
as a matter of treaty interpretation.
Nationalists and transnationalists adopt different approaches
34. The court's power to enforce a treaty on behalf of an individual is a function of
jurisdiction. If a court has jurisdiction over a claim, and an individual has the power to
invoke a treaty, then the court has the power to enforce the treaty on behalf of that
individual.
35. See Sloss, supra note 18.
36. See infra Part IV(A)(3).
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to treaty interpretation. Transnationalists maintain that treaty inter-
pretation should be governed primarily (but not exclusively) by prin-
ciples of international law because treaties are international legal in-
struments. 3 7  Nationalists, in contrast, contend that treaty
interpretation should be governed largely by principles of federal law
because treaties have the status of supreme federal law. 38 This is not
a black-and-white distinction; it is a matter of emphasis. Thus, for
example, nationalists agree that U.S. courts should ordinarily con-
strue treaties in accordance with the internationally agreed under-
standing of their terms.3 9 Even so, the difference in emphasis be-
tween nationalist and transnationalist approaches can yield
dramatically different results in concrete cases.
The transnationalist model of treaty interpretation applies the
twin canons of good faith and liberal interpretation. The canon of
good faith stipulates that treaties "are to be kept in most scrupulous
good faith, ' '40 and that a treaty "should be interpreted.. . in a manner
to carry out its manifest purpose."'41 The companion canon of liberal
interpretation adds: "treaties should be liberally interpreted with a
view to protecting the citizens of the respective countries in rights
thereby secured. '42 The canon of good faith emphasizes mutuality of
obligation: we should extend to the citizens of our treaty partners the
same consideration that we would want them to extend to U.S. citi-
zens. The canon of liberal interpretation applies a presumption in fa-
vor of primary individual rights: when in doubt, the treaty should be
interpreted to protect primary individual rights.43 When combined
with the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies for
violations of individual treaty rights, the canons of good faith and
liberal interpretation help ensure that U.S. courts provide substantial
legal protection for the citizens of other nations with whom the
United States has concluded treaties. This approach tends to promote
harmonious diplomatic relations between the United States and its
treaty partners.
37. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 1887-88.
38. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Sanchez-Llamas applies the nationalist approach
in this respect. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684.
39. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 659-61 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
40. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884) (quoting JAMES KENT, 1
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 174).
41. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (citing HANNIs TAYLOR, A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW § 383 (1901).
42. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 581 (1908).
43. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933) ("[llf a treaty fairly
admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed under it, and
the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.").
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In the years since World War II, the canons of good faith and
liberal interpretation have been supplanted by the nationalist canon of
judicial deference to executive branch treaty interpretations. 44 Defer-
ence is not absolute. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained
that "courts interpret treaties for themselves. '45 Nevertheless, Pro-
fessor Bederman has argued persuasively that, at least since the
1960s, "judicial deference to the Executive's position on treaty inter-
pretation is the single best predictor of interpretive outcomes in
American treaty cases."'46 Whereas judicial application of the canon
of good faith promoted harmony with U.S. treaty partners, judicial
deference to executive treaty interpretation tends to generate friction
with them. Moreover, whereas the canon of liberal interpretation
provides expansive protection for individual treaty rights, deference
to the executive tends to restrict the scope of treaty-based individual
rights.
C. Treaties and the Domestic Law of Remedies
1. Different Presumptions
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Robert Bork, then a
federal appellate judge, wrote:
Treaties of the United States, though the law of the
land, do not generally create rights that are privately
enforceable in courts. Absent authorizing legislation,
an individual has access to courts for enforcement of a
treaty's provisions only when the treaty is self-
executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly pro-
vides a private right of action. 47
In the first sentence, the phrase "rights that are privately enforceable
in courts" clearly refers to remedial rights, not primary rights. Thus,
under the nationalist model, there is a presumption that individuals
are not entitled to domestic judicial remedies for violations of indi-
vidual treaty rights. The second sentence makes clear that there are
two ways, and only two ways, to overcome that presumption: (1) if
there is "authorizing legislation" that empowers courts to grant judi-
cial remedies; or (2) if the treaty itself "provides a private right of ac-
44. See infra notes 428-34 and accompanying text.
45. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
46. Bederman, Deference or Deception, supra note 19, at 1464-65.
47. 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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tion." Thus, under the nationalist model, there is a presumption
against judicial remedies for treaty violations, and the individual in-
voking a treaty before a domestic court has the burden of overcoming
that presumption.
The transnationalist model, in contrast, adopts a presumption
in favor of domestic judicial remedies for violations of individual
treaty rights. The core principle of the transnationalist model is "that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ... whenever
that right is invaded. '48 Not every treaty provision creates individual
rights. If a treaty does not create primary individual rights, then the
presumption in favor of judicial remedies does not apply. However,
if a treaty has the status of supreme federal law,49 and it creates or
protects individual rights, the transnationalist model presumes that an
individual whose treaty rights were violated is entitled to a domestic
judicial remedy.50 That presumption can be overcome if the treaty
explicitly bars domestic judicial remedies, or if Congress has enacted
legislation expressly precluding judicial enforcement of the treaty.
The mere failure of the political branches to create an express private
right of action, however, is not a bar to judicial enforcement of a
treaty provision that protects individual rights.
Treaties can be invoked both offensively by plaintiffs and de-
fensively by civil or criminal defendants. A civil or criminal defen-
dant does not need a right of access to court because he has been
haled into court against his will. Thus, when courts applying the na-
tionalist model suggest that an individual defendant requires a "pri-
vate right of action" to enforce a treaty, they presumably mean that
the defendant requires a power to invoke the treaty, not a right of ac-
cess to court. 5' Under the transnationalist presumption in favor of
48. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (quoting
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23).
49. The transnationalist presumption applies only if the treaty provision at issue is the
"Law of the Land" under the Supremacy Clause. Under the express terms of the
Constitution, every treaty "made . . . under the Authority of the United States" is the
"supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a detailed textual analysis of
this constitutional provision, see Sloss, supra note 18, at 46-55. Unless otherwise specified,
this article is concerned only with treaty provisions that are the "Law of the Land" under the
Supremacy Clause.
50. See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("Each treaty stipulates something respecting the citizens of the two nations,
and gives them rights. Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is
sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have
this right, it is to be protected."); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,
110 (1801) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the
rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be
regarded by the court as an act of congress .... ").
51. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 575-76 (Or. 2005) (suggesting,
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judicial enforcement, an individual defendant whose rights are pro-
tected by a treaty is presumed to have the power to invoke that treaty
before a domestic court, absent countervailing action by the political
branches. 52 However, under the nationalist presumption against judi-
cial enforcement, individual defendants lack the power to invoke
treaties, even treaties that protect individual rights, unless the politi-
cal branches have taken affirmative steps to grant individuals that
power.
Apart from the power to invoke a treaty, individual plaintiffs
must also establish a right of access to court. During the early nine-
teenth century, individual plaintiffs routinely relied on common law
rights of action to provide a right of access to court to pursue their
treaty-based claims. 53 Thus, under the transnationalist model, if a
plaintiff can show that he has primary rights protected by a treaty,
and he has a right of access to court based on common law or some
other domestic law source, there is no additional showing required to
establish that he has the power to invoke the treaty before a domestic
court. However, under the nationalist model, even if a plaintiff has
rights protected by a treaty, and even if a federal statute grants him a
right of access to U.S. courts, he must still identify some other statu-
tory or treaty provision that grants him the power to invoke the treaty
before a domestic court.54
In sum, the two models apply opposing presumptions in cases
where an individual litigant seeks judicial enforcement of a treaty
that protects individual rights, but that does not create an express pri-
in a case where a criminal defendant sought to invoke a treaty as the basis for a defense in a
criminal proceeding, that treaties are "enforceable by individuals" only if the "treaty as a
whole" manifests an intent to create "an individual right of action").
52. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (reversing a criminal
conviction on the ground that a treaty immunized the defendant from criminal prosecution
for the offense charged, even though the treaty did not expressly empower the defendant to
invoke that treaty before a domestic court). See also infra notes 410-19 and accompanying
text (discussing Rauscher in more detail).
53. See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (suit to foreclose on
mortgage); Soc'y for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464
(1823) (action for ejectment); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 594 (1818) (equitable
action to divide a tract of land); Chirac v. Lessee of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817)
(action for ejectment); Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415 (1808) (suit to foreclose on
mortgage); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185 (1808) (suit for breach
of contract); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806) (suit to recover payment on
bond); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804) (suit to recover payment on
bond).
54. This was the logic of the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d
33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The petitioner filed a habeas petition to enforce his rights under the
Geneva Conventions. The D.C. Circuit said: "The availability of habeas may obviate a
petitioner's need to rely on a private right of action . . . but it does not render a treaty
judicially enforceable." Id. at 40.
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vate right of action. Under the nationalist model, courts exceed their
authority if they grant remedies to individuals for violations of such
treaties, unless Congress has enacted legislation authorizing private
enforcement of the treaty. Under the transnationalist model, courts
abdicate their responsibility if they refuse to grant remedies for viola-
tions of such treaties, unless the treaty explicitly bars domestic judi-
cial remedies, or Congress has enacted legislation expressly preclud-
ing judicial enforcement of the treaty.
2. Different Methodologies
In a famous speech in 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes declared
that it puts "the cart before the horse ... to consider the right or the
duty as something existing apart from and independent of the conse-
quences of its breach, to which certain sanctions are added after-
ward. ' '55 In an equally famous critique of Holmes, Henry Hart stated:
"Holmes' 'cart' is the horse and his 'horse' is the cart .... The re-
medial parts of law-rights of action and other sanctions-are sub-
sidiary. To the primary parts they have the relation of means to ends.
They come second not first."'56
Courts applying the nationalist model are the intellectual de-
scendants of Holmes. They typically begin by asking questions
about remedial law, not primary law. Under the nationalist method,
it would be inappropriate for a court to consider whether a treaty pro-
tects individual rights, or whether those rights have been violated, un-
til after the court has determined that the individual has a private
right of action. If the individual lacks a private right of action, then
the individual is not entitled to a judicial remedy in any case, so it
would be a waste of judicial resources to attempt to answer questions
about primary rights.
Courts applying the transnationalist model, by contrast, can
be viewed as the intellectual predecessors or descendants of Henry
Hart. They typically begin by asking questions about primary law,
not remedial law, because the "remedial parts of law ... come sec-
ond not first."'57 Under the transnationalist method, it is not neces-
sary to inquire whether the treaty creates a private right of action, be-
cause every individual who is properly before the court 58 and whose
55. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897).
56. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REV. 929,
935 (1951).
57. Id.
58. An individual defendant is properly before the court if he is subject to the court's
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individual treaty rights have been violated is entitled to a judicial
remedy, assuming that the political branches have not foreclosed ju-
dicial remedies. By deciding explicitly that the individual's rights
have been violated, the court also decides (implicitly, at least) that
the individual is entitled to a remedy. Of course, individual cases
may raise difficult questions about the appropriate remedy. In the
vast majority of cases, though, the central question of remedial law-
whether the individual is entitled to some remedy--does not require
separate analysis, because the court answers that question by decid-
ing whether the individual's primary rights have been violated. 59
In short, the transnationalist model applies a "rights-focused"
methodology, whereas the nationalist model applies a "remedies-
focused" methodology. The contrast between the transnationalist and
nationalist methodologies has tremendous practical significance be-
cause treaties rarely create an express private right of action, and
Congress rarely enacts legislation authorizing individuals to enforce a
specific treaty. Therefore, if the Supreme Court endorses the nation-
alist model, it will lead to a substantial right-remedy gap in the do-
mestic law of treaties. If the Supreme Court continues to apply the
transnationalist model, though, it would minimize the right-remedy
gap, because most treaties that protect individual rights would be ju-
dicially enforceable.
III. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE NATIONALIST AND
TRANSNATIONALIST MODELS IN HAMDAN AND SANCHEZ-
LLAMAS
Part Three analyzes the Supreme Court decisions in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon60 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 6' as they relate to the
conflict between the nationalist and transnationalist models. In San-
chez-Llamas, the Oregon Supreme Court squarely endorsed the na-
tionalist presumption against private enforcement of treaties in U.S.
territorial jurisdiction. Under the transnationalist model, an individual plaintiff is properly
before the court if there is some provision of law-common law, statute, treaty, or other-
that grants him a right of access to court.
59. Under the transnationalist model, there are three circumstances in which an
individual whose treaty rights were violated is not entitled to a remedy: (1) if the political
branches have taken affirmative action to limit judicial remedies; (2) if the individual did not
suffer any harm or prejudice as a result of the treaty violation; or (3) if the defendant is
protected by an affirmative defense, such as sovereign immunity.
60. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
61. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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courts. 62 Similarly, in Hamdan the D.C. Circuit also endorsed the na-
tionalist presumption. 63 In both cases, though, the Supreme Court
dodged the issue whether there is a presumption for or against private
enforcement, and refused to decide whether the treaties at issue cre-
ate judicially enforceable individual rights.64
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will probably con-
front the issue again in the near future. Despite the Court's refusal to
endorse a presumption for or against private enforcement, analysis of
individual opinions indicates that the Court is deeply divided on the
question. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter clearly en-
dorse the transnationalist presumption in favor of individual en-
forcement of treaty rights. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito appear to support the nationalist presumption
against individually enforceable rights. Justice Kennedy remains un-
decided. His vote will be crucial in future cases presenting the issue.
A. Sanchez-Llamas and the Vienna Convention
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is a
multilateral treaty that regulates the functions of consular officers.65
Article 36 of the VCCR stipulates that "consular officers shall be free
to communicate with nationals of the sending state" and that foreign
nationals "shall have the same freedom with respect to communica-
tion with and access to consular officers of the sending State. '66
These rights of communication and access apply expressly to any
foreign national who "is arrested or committed to prison or to cus-
tody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. '67 For any for-
eign national who is arrested or otherwise detained in the United
States, the United States has an obligation to "inform the person con-
cerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph. '68 Un-
fortunately, the United States has frequently violated its treaty obliga-
62. State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005).
63. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
64. Interestingly, the Court seems to have adopted a transnationalist approach to treaty
interpretation in Hamdan, whereas it applied a nationalist approach in Sanchez-Llamas.
Since this article focuses primarily on issues pertaining to domestic remedies, not issues
related to treaty interpretation, Part Three does not address the Court's approach to treaty
interpretation in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas.
65. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. See also LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1991).
66. VCCR, supra note 65, art. 36(1)(a).
67. Id. art. 36(1)(b).
68. Id.
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tion to inform detained foreign nationals about their Article 36 rights,
largely because many arresting officers are not aware of their obliga-
tions under the VCCR. State courts and lower federal courts have
decided hundreds of cases in the past decade involving claims under
Article 36.69 In the vast majority of cases, courts have refused to
provide judicial remedies to individuals invoking the treaty despite
clear evidence of treaty violations.70
In Sanchez-Llamas, the State of Oregon arrested the defen-
dant, a Mexican national, in December 1999. It is undisputed that
Oregon violated the VCCR because the police did not "inform him
that he could ask to have the Mexican Consulate notified of his de-
tention. '71 The state charged defendant with attempted murder and
other felonies. 72 Defendant learned about the VCCR before the case
went to trial. Accordingly, he filed a pre-trial motion to suppress
statements he had made to the police. The trial court denied his mo-
tion to suppress and convicted him of eleven felony counts. The
Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding "that Article
36 of the VCCR does not create rights that individual foreign nation-
als may assert in a criminal proceeding. '73
The Oregon Supreme Court reached this conclusion by apply-
ing the nationalist presumption against judicial remedies. The court
stated explicitly that there is "a presumption against the creation of
individual, judicially enforceable rights" by means of treaties. 74
Moreover, the court asserted that treaties permit "enforcement by an
individual right of action, only when a specific intent to create such
individual rights [of action] can be discerned from the treaty as a
whole. ' 75  Consistent with nationalist methodology, the court's
69. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2694 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that this issue "has arisen hundreds of times in the lower federal and state
courts").
70. This author is aware of only two cases in which U.S. courts have rendered
judgments in favor of individual petitioners seeking relief for violations of Article 36. See
Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Article 36 creates an individual
right that is enforceable in an action for money damages brought under the Alien Tort
Statute); Osbaldo Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004), reprinted in 43
I.L.M. 1227 (2004) (staying execution of death row prisoner and remanding case to district
court for evidentiary hearing to determine whether prisoner was prejudiced by the State's
violation of his rights under the VCCR).
71. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676.
72. Id.
73. State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 574 (Or. 2005).
74. Id. at 576 ("In fact, the general rule, widely recognized in the federal courts, is that
rights created by international treaties belong to the signatory state and are not enforceable in
American courts by private individuals.").
75. Id. at 575. See also id. at 576 ("Certainly, the noted presumption can be overcome
by explicit wording and even by provisions that necessarily imply a private right of judicial
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analysis dodged the question whether Article 36 creates primary in-
dividual rights.76 Instead, the court said, even if the defendant's indi-
vidual rights were violated, he was not entitled to a remedy because
"there is nothing about the subject matter of the VCCR that would
compel an inference that a private right of action was intended."'77
Since the defendant's right of access to court was not at issue, the
Court evidently used the term "private right of action" to refer to a
power to invoke a treaty before a domestic court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sanchez-Llamas to
decide, inter alia, whether Article 36 of the VCCR conveys "individ-
ual rights ... to a foreign detainee enforceable in the Courts of the
United States. ' 78 The companion case of Bustillo v. Johnson, which
the Supreme Court consolidated with Sanchez-Llamas, presented the
question whether "state courts may refuse to consider violations of
Article 36 .. .because the treaty does not create individually en-
forceable rights. ' 79 Both the State of Oregon, in Sanchez-Llamas,
and the State of Virginia, in Bustillo, urged the Court to endorse the
nationalist presumption against private enforcement of treaties. Ore-
gon argued that "[t]he presumption is against finding an individually
enforceable right implied in the treaty. ' 80 Similarly, Virginia as-
serted: "Even if the VCCR does create individual rights, those rights
are not judicially enforceable ... [because] the Treaty's text does not
provide for judicial enforcement."'81 Additionally, the United States,
as amicus curiae, urged the Court to endorse the nationalist presump-
tion "that treaties ... do not create judicially enforceable individual
rights.' 82
Despite these arguments, the Court refused to decide whether
the VCCR creates individually enforceable rights. Instead, writing
for himself and four other Justices, Chief Justice Roberts's majority
opinion assumed, without deciding, that Article 36 does "grant[] in-
dividuals enforceable rights. ' 83 The majority affirmed the Oregon
enforcement.").
76. See id. at 575-78.
77. Id. at 577.
78. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, No. 04-10566, Questions Presented, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-10566qp.pdf.
79. Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51, Questions Presented, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00051 qp.pdf.
80. Brief for Respondent State of Oregon at 13, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct 2669
(2006) (No. 04-10566), 2006 WL 259987.
81. Brief of the Respondent at 19, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct 2669 (2006) (No. 05-
51), 2006 WL 259993.
82. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
83. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct at 2677-78 ("Because we conclude that Sanchez-
Llamas and Bustillo are not in any event entitled to relief on their claims, we find it
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Supreme Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas on the ground that sup-
pression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36.84
Similarly, the majority affirmed the Virginia state court's decision in
Bustillo on the grounds that a State may apply its regular rules of
procedural default to Article 36 claims. 85 However, the five Justices
who comprised the majority did not adopt the nationalist presumption
against judicial remedies.
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he con-
tended that Article 36 of the VCCR does create judicially enforceable
individual rights. 86 His analysis began with the premise that a court
should resort to a treaty for a rule of decision "whenever its provi-
sions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or
subject may be determined. '87 In other words, in accordance with
the transnationalist model, Justice Breyer asserted that courts have
the duty to enforce treaties at the behest of private individuals when-
ever a treaty creates primary individual rights. Applying this analy-
sis, Justice Breyer concluded that Article 36 creates individual rights
that "do not differ in their 'nature' from other procedural rights that
courts commonly enforce," 88 and that "this Court has routinely per-
mitted individuals to enforce treaty provisions similar to Article 36 in
domestic judicial proceedings. '89 In response to the assertion that
there is a presumption that treaties do not create judicially enforce-
able individual rights, Justice Breyer stated emphatically "that no
such presumption exists." 90 In short, Justice Breyer's opinion deci-
sively rejected the nationalist presumption against judicial remedies
and endorsed the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined this portion
of Justice Breyer's opinion. 91
unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals
enforceable rights. Therefore, for purposes of addressing petitioners' claims, we assume,
without deciding, that Article 36 does grant Bustillo and Sanchez-Llamas such rights.").
84. Id. at 2678-82.
85. Id. at 2682-87. Whereas Sanchez-Llamas raised the Article 36 issue at trial, and
sought a suppression remedy, Bustillo raised the Article 36 issue for the first time in a
habeas corpus petition filed in state court. See id. at 2676. The main thrust of his argument
was that the treaty preempted state procedural default rules.
86. See id. at 2693-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2695 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2696.
90. Id. at 2697.
91. Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority that Sanchez-Llamas was not entitled
to a suppression remedy. Id. at 2688-89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She also concurred with
the majority that procedural default rules barred Bustillo's claim. Id. at 2689-90. However,
she joined the portion of Breyer's dissent in which he defended the view that the VCCR does
create individually enforceable rights. She also stated explicitly in her concurring opinion
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B. Hamdan and the Geneva Conventions
The POW Convention92 is one of four treaties regulating the
conduct of warfare that were concluded in 1949 and that are referred
to collectively as the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions
set forth a detailed code of conduct that is designed to provide hu-
manitarian protection for victims of warfare, including the sick and
wounded,93 prisoners of war,94 and civilians. 95 Of particular concern
here is Common Article 3, a provision that is identical in all four
treaties. Common Article 3 applies to "armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character. '96 It prohibits "the passing of sentences . . .
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples. '97
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order au-
thorizing the creation of military commissions to conduct trials of in-
dividuals who are past or current members of al Qaeda, or who have
engaged in terrorist activities harmful to the United States. 98 Forces
allied with the United States captured Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a
Yemeni national, in Afghanistan in November 2001. The United
States has detained Hamdan at Guantanamo Bay since June 2002. 99
In July 2003, President Bush designated Hamdan for trial by military
commission. In response, Hamdan filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the President's authority to try him by military commis-
sion. The district court granted his petition, holding expressly that
trial by military commission would violate Hamdan's rights under
the Geneva Conventions. 100
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
that "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked by an individual
in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 2688.
92. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention].
93. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
94. See POW Convention, supra note 92.
95. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
96. POW Convention, supra note 92, art. 3.
97. Id.
98. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
99. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
100. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-65 (D.D.C. 2004).
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POW Convention "does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce
its provisions in court."1 01 The court reached this result by applying
an exceptionally rigid version of the nationalist model. The court's
analysis merits scrutiny because Chief Justice Roberts, who was a
judge on the D.C. Circuit at that time, was a member of the panel that
decided Hamdan in the D.C. Circuit, and he joined fully in Judge
Randolph's majority opinion. The court began its analysis by adopt-
ing the nationalist presumption against private enforcement of trea-
ties. 102 Even if one accepts that presumption, though, the nationalist
model permits private enforcement of treaties if Congress has author-
ized such enforcement. Hamdan alleged that his custody violated the
POW Convention. He brought his claim under the federal habeas
statute, which expressly authorizes federal courts to grant habeas re-
lief for individuals who are "in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States."'01 3 Thus, Hamdan's
claim is the precise type of claim that Congress authorized in the fed-
eral habeas statute.
Even so, the D.C. Circuit held that the habeas statute merely
granted the district court jurisdiction over Hamdan's habeas petition,
but it "did not render the Geneva Convention judicially enforce-
able." 04 Apparently, then, for the D.C. Circuit (and for Chief Justice
Roberts) to find that a treaty is judicially enforceable in a federal ha-
beas petition, either the treaty drafters must refer specifically to the
U.S. habeas statute in the text of the treaty, or Congress must refer
specifically to the particular treaty in the text of the habeas statute.
This exceedingly rigid version of the nationalist model is at odds
with nineteenth century Supreme Court precedents. 10 5 It imposes un-
realistic constraints on the political branches. 10 6 As a practical mat-
ter, this approach, which Chief Justice Roberts seemingly approved,
would make it virtually impossible for individuals to obtain domestic
judicial remedies for violations of their treaty-based individual rights.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdan to decide
101. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102. Id. at 38 ("This country has traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding
that they do not create judicially enforceable individual rights.").
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
104. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40.
105. See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) (granting habeas
relief to petitioner who was detained in violation of a treaty). See also infra notes 391-95
and accompanying text (discussing Chew Heong).
106. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002
SuP. CT. REv. 343, 378-90 (2000) (pointing out the practical necessities and historical trends
that have required courts to "flesh out statutory enactments" beyond the narrow textualist
methods of statutory construction).
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two questions: (1) whether the President had statutory and/or consti-
tutional authority to utilize military commissions "to try petitioner
and others similarly situated for alleged war crimes in the 'war on
terror;"' and (2) whether Guantanamo detainees who have been des-
ignated for trial by military commission can "obtain judicial en-
forcement from an Article III court of rights protected under the 1949
Geneva Convention in an action for a writ of habeas corpus challeng-
ing the legality of their detention by the Executive branch[.]"' 1 7 The
government's brief on the merits devoted several pages to defending
the proposition that the "Geneva Convention does not give rise to ju-
dicially enforceable rights."'108 The government's argument relied
heavily on the nationalist model, asserting that there is a "long-
established presumption . . that treaties and other international
agreements do not create judicially enforceable rights."'109
The Supreme Court decided Hamdan by a 5-3 majority; Chief
Justice Roberts recused himself because he was a member of the
panel that decided the case in the D.C. Circuit. The bulk of Justice
Stevens' majority opinion addressed a variety of statutory interpreta-
tion questions. 1 0 The majority held that the Detainee Treatment Act
did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over cases, such as Hamdan,
that were pending at the time the statute was enacted.' In response
to the government's argument that Congress had authorized the use
of military commissions, the Court held that the relevant statutes "at
most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene mili-
tary commissions in circumstances where justified under the Consti-
tution and laws, including the law of war."' 1 2 The majority held that
the commissions created by the Bush Administration are inconsistent
with the statutory requirement, embodied in Article 36 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), that "the rules applied to
military commissions must be the same as those applied to courts-
martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable."'"13
107. Questions Presented, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (Nov. 11, 2005) (No.
05-184), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00184qp.pdf.
108. Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 30-37.
109. Id. at 30.
110. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct 2749.
111. Id. at 2762-69. After the Court granted certiorari in Hamdan, Congress passed the
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts over cases
filed by or on behalf of Guantanamo detainees. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, Div. A, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739. The government filed a motion to dismiss
the Hamdan case for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the DTA deprived the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction over the pending case. See Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 77694.
112. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775.
113. Id. at 2790.
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In the final portion of its opinion, the Court held that "[t]he
procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva Conven-
tions." 114 In its rationale in support of this conclusion, the majority
said that it did not need to decide whether the Geneva Conventions
are judicially enforceable. 1 5 Since Article 21 of the UCMJ author-
izes trial by military commission only "with respect to offenders or
offenses that ... by the law of war may be tried by military commis-
sions,"116 and since the Court indisputably has the authority to en-
force the UCMJ, and since the Geneva Conventions are "part of the
law of war" referenced in Article 21,117 the majority concluded that it
had to interpret and apply the Conventions in order to determine
whether Hamdan's commission was permissible under Article 21.
Applying this rationale, the Court held that Hamdan is entitled to the
protections of Common Article 3 because the United States' conflict
with al Qaeda is a "conflict not of an international character" within
the meaning of Common Article 3.118 The Court also held that Ham-
dan's military commission violates the treaty requirement that pris-
oners protected by Common Article 3 must be tried by a "regularly
constituted court."'1 19 Based on this rationale, the majority enforced
Common Article 3 without deciding whether the Geneva Conven-
tions are judicially enforceable in the absence of implementing legis-
lation, and without addressing the conflict between the nationalist
and transnationalist models.
The three dissenters disagreed with virtually every major con-
clusion of the majority opinion. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Thomas and Alito, argued that the Detainee Treatment Act deprived
the Court of jurisdiction over the case. 120 Justice Alito, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that the Bush Administration's
military commissions are "regularly constituted court[s]" within the
meaning of Common Article 3.121 Most importantly for purposes of
this article, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, ar-
114. Id. at 2793.
115. Id. at 2793-94.
116. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
117. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct at 2794.
118. Id. at 2794-96. It is noteworthy that the Court rejected the President's
interpretation of Common Article 3. See Sloss, supra note 19 (discussing the Court's non-
deferential approach to treaty interpretation in Hamdan).
119. Id. at 2796-97. A plurality of four Justices also approved Hamdan's argument that
the military commission procedures adopted by the Bush Administration violate Common
Article 3 because they do not afford "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples." Id. at 2797-98. Justice Kennedy did not join this
portion of Justice Stevens's opinion.
120. Id. at 2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2850-55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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gued that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable.' 22
Surprisingly, Justice Thomas's argument did not explicitly
invoke the nationalist presumption against judicial enforcement. In-
stead, he argued that "Hamdan's Geneva Convention claims are fore-
closed by Johnson v. Eisentrager.'1 23 In Eisentrager, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that the rights of alien enemies under a 1929
prisoner of war treaty were not judicially enforceable because the
drafters intended that diplomatic measures would be the exclusive
mechanism for vindicating their treaty rights. 124 Without any expla-
nation or analysis, Justice Thomas asserted that the 1949 POW Con-
vention, like the 1929 predecessor convention, contemplates that dip-
lomatic measures provide the exclusive enforcement mechanism. 125
In fact, the 1949 POW Convention does not contain any language in-
dicating that diplomacy is the exclusive enforcement mechanism, nor
does it contain language manifesting an intention to preclude domes-
tic judicial remedies.
As a formal matter, Justice Thomas's analysis in Hamdan is
consistent with the transnationalist model. Thomas's dissent does not
explicitly endorse the nationalist presumption against judicial en-
forcement of treaties. Instead, he claims that the POW Convention is
not judicially enforceable because the treaty drafters chose to pre-
clude domestic judicial enforcement by stipulating that diplomatic
measures would provide the exclusive enforcement mechanism. This
analysis is superficially consistent with the transnationalist model be-
cause that model recognizes that the treaty makers can preclude do-
122. Id. at 2844-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2844 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950)).
124. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14. Justice Thomas characterized the key statement
in Eisentrager as "an alternative holding." See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2844 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The claim that this was an "alternative holding" is simply not true. In
Eisentrager, the Supreme Court held that there was "no basis for invoking federal judicial
power in any district." Id. at 790. Parts I to III of the Court's opinion provided the rationale
supporting that conclusion. See id. at 768-85. The footnote that Justice Thomas relies upon
is in Part IV, which addressed the merits of the prisoners' habeas petition. Id. at 785-90. As
the dissent in Eisentrager noted, the "petition for certiorari here presented no question
except that of jurisdiction; and neither party has argued, orally or in briefs, that this Court
should pass on the sufficiency of the petition." Id. at 792 (Black, J., dissenting). Thus, the
Eisentrager footnote addressed an issue that was never argued before the Supreme Court and
that the Court, according to its own holding in the case, lacked jurisdiction to decide.
125. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The judicial
nonenforceability of the Geneva Conventions derives from the fact that those Conventions
have exclusive enforcement mechanisms.") Justice Thomas cites Eisentrager as authority
for this proposition, despite the fact that Eisentrager concerned a different treaty. Justice
Thomas does not cite any provision of the 1949 POW Convention to support his contention
that this treaty has exclusive enforcement mechanisms.
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mestic judicial enforcement by providing in the treaty that some other
remedial mechanism is the exclusive enforcement mechanism. Even
so, Justices Thomas, Scalia and Alito manifested their antipathy to-
wards domestic judicial remedies for treaty violations by stating,
without any supporting evidence, that the drafters of the 1949 POW
Convention chose to preclude domestic judicial enforcement. Thus,
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion suggests that the three Hamdan
dissenters would likely favor the nationalist model, rather than the
transnationalist model, in a case that squarely presented the choice.
C. Implications for Future Cases
The Court's opinion in Sanchez-Llamas does not preclude all
avenues of judicial relief for violations of Article 36 of the VCCR.
In particular, the Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that for-
eign nationals may be able to vindicate their rights under Article 36
through ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. With respect to the
procedural default issue, the Court held only that Article 36 claims
are subject to "the same procedural default rules that apply generally
to other federal-law claims."'126 Procedural default rules do not gen-
erally preclude a habeas petitioner from raising a claim that trial
counsel's representation fell below the minimum constitutional re-
quirements of the Sixth Amendment. The majority in Sanchez-
Llamas emphasized that, in our adversarial system, it is the defense
counsel's responsibility to raise the Article 36 issue at or before
trial.' 27 Thus, the Court's rationale in Sanchez-Llamas may support
an argument in future habeas petitions that trial counsel's perform-
ance was constitutionally deficient because counsel failed to advise
his client of his rights under Article 36.128 Given the large number of
foreign nationals imprisoned in the United States who have been de-
nied their Article 36 rights, it is likely that state and federal courts
will soon be faced with numerous Article 36 claims that are dressed
up as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
To resolve those claims, courts could dodge the question
126. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2687 (2006).
127. See id. at 2685 (stating that an adversarial system "relies chiefly on the parties to
raise significant issues and present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the
appropriate time"); id. at 2686 ("In our [adversarial] system,. . . the responsibility for failing
to raise an issue generally rests with the parties themselves.").
128. See id. at 2690 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[O]nce Bustillo became aware of
his Vienna Convention rights, nothing prevented him from raising an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim predicated on his trial counsel's failure to assert the State's violation of
those rights.").
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whether Article 36 creates individually enforceable rights by holding
that a defense attorney's failure to raise the Article 36 issue did not
violate the Sixth Amendment, or that the foreign national client was
not prejudiced by that failure.1 29 But it is likely that some courts will
address directly the question whether Article 36 creates individually
enforceable rights. To answer that question, courts will have to
choose between the transnationalist presumption in favor of private
enforcement of individual treaty rights and the nationalist presump-
tion against private enforcement. Therefore, the Supreme Court may
well confront another VCCR case within the next few years that pre-
sents the conflict between the nationalist and transnationalist models.
At first blush, it may appear that the recently enacted Military
Commissions Act of 2006 precludes any further Supreme Court re-
view of claims by Guantanamo detainees based on the Geneva Con-
ventions. 130 Section 3 of the Act creates a new Chapter 47A in Title
10 of the U.S. Code. 31 Included in the new Chapter 47A is §
948b(g), which states: "No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject
to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights."'1 32 This provision clearly
precludes specified individuals from invoking the Geneva Conven-
tions during a trial by military commission. If the military commis-
sion renders a guilty verdict, § 950g provides for judicial review by
the D.C. Circuit, and then by the Supreme Court.133 It is unclear
whether § 948b(g) precludes an enemy combatant convicted by a
military commission from invoking the Geneva Conventions in ap-
pellate proceedings before the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court. 134
129. Under the test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), a habeas petitioner who seeks reversal of a criminal conviction based on
ineffective assistance of counsel must show that his trial counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at
687. To establish prejudice based on a VCCR violation, the petitioner would have to show
two things: (1) that he would have sought consular assistance if the attorney had advised
him of his rights under the VCCR; and (2) that consular assistance would probably have
affected the outcome of the trial. Absent contrary evidence, the first point could presumably
be established by submitting an affidavit to that effect. Proving that consular assistance
would have affected the outcome of trial is more difficult. Assuming that the petitioner
bears the burden of proof on this issue, the majority of petitioners are likely to lose.
However, Bustillo is one case where the petitioner presented fairly compelling evidence that
consular assistance would have yielded a different trial outcome. See Brief for Petitioner
Mario A. Bustillo, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (No. 05-51), 2005 WL 3597704.
130. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
131. Id. § 3(a)(1).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The statutory language, on its face, could be construed to preclude alien unlawful
enemy combatants from invoking the Geneva Conventions in any proceeding before any
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Assume that § 948b(g) does not preclude a convicted alien
from invoking the Geneva Conventions during such appellate pro-
ceedings. The alien must still overcome at least one other hurdle.
Section 5(a) of the Military Commissions Act states: "No person
may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any
habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United
States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the
Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a
source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or terri-
tories."' 35 This provision precludes application of the Geneva Con-
ventions in a "habeas corpus or other civil action." However, one
could argue that the procedure for exercising judicial review of a fi-
nal judgment rendered by a military commission is neither a habeas
corpus proceeding nor a civil action; it is an appeal from a criminal
conviction. Thus, it is unclear whether Section 5(a) precludes a
criminal defendant from invoking the Geneva Conventions in an ap-
peal challenging the validity of a final judgment rendered by a mili-
tary commission. 136
Suppose, however, that the Court construes § 948b(g), or sec-
tion 5(a), or both, to prohibit a criminal defendant from invoking the
Geneva Conventions in an appeal from the final judgment of a mili-
tary commission. In that case, the Court will have to decide whether
those provisions are constitutional. It is firmly established that the
government "must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity
to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process
Clause."' 37 Although there is no case directly on point, the "oppor-
tunity to be heard" arguably means that, if a criminal defendant con-
tests the validity of procedures utilized by the government to obtain a
criminal conviction, he has the opportunity to raise any legal argu-
ment he chooses, and the court has a duty to address the merits of
that argument (assuming that the defendant has not waived the argu-
U.S. court. Such a construction is arguably overbroad, though, because § 948b(g) is
included in chapter 47A of Title 10, a portion of the U.S. Code that addresses the structure
and process of military commissions. For the most part, Chapter 47A says nothing about
judicial proceedings before federal courts.
135 Id. § 5(a).
136. Section 5(a) refers to "any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding." Id.
(emphasis added). If one construes the phrase "or proceeding" to encompass any other
judicial proceeding of any kind, then the phrase "habeas corpus or other civil action" would
be superfluous. On the other hand, if one construes the statute to apply only to a "habeas
corpus or other civil action," then the phrase "or proceeding" would be superfluous. Thus, it
is unclear whether the phrase "or proceeding" was intended to expand the scope of the
statutory language to apply to a judicial proceeding other than a habeas corpus or other civil
action.
137. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
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ment, for example, by failing to raise it in a timely fashion). 138 It is
beyond the scope of this article to analyze this procedural due proc-
ess argument in detail. 139 The main point is that there are non-trivial
arguments in support of the view that, notwithstanding § 948b(g) and
section 5(a), defendants convicted by a military commission can in-
voke the Geneva Conventions in a subsequent appeal to the Supreme
Court. In deciding whether to address the merits of such an appeal,
the Court may be forced to choose between the nationalist and trans-
nationalist models.
As noted above, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in San-
chez-Llamas strongly suggests that Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg are prepared to endorse the transnationalist presump-
tion in favor of judicial remedies. Chief Justice Roberts's decision to
138. The opportunity to be heard is an essential procedural right of both civil and
criminal defendants. Although the Due Process Clause does not guarantee plaintiffs a right
of access to courts, "due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's defense."
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377 (quoting Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897)). The
distinction between plaintiffs and defendants is fundamental, because plaintiffs have the
option of resolving their disputes through "private structuring of individual relationships,"
but defendants are "forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial
process." Id. at 375-77. Even in the nineteenth century, well before the advent of the
modem "due process revolution," the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that defendants
must have an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277
(1876) ("Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the
liability and the right are inseparable. This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as
such by the common intelligence and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court
pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is
not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other
tribunal.").
139. One potential counter-argument is a "greater power includes the lesser power"
argument. There is no doubt that Congress has the constitutional authority to enact
legislation superseding the Geneva Conventions. Thus, for example, Congress could have
added language to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 along the following lines: "In the
event of a conflict between the Geneva Conventions and the procedures specified herein,
courts shall apply the procedures embodied in this Act." Such language would preclude
courts from applying the Geneva Conventions by making clear that Congress intended to
supersede the Conventions as a matter of domestic law. Thus, one could argue, the greater
power to supersede the Geneva Conventions includes the lesser power to preclude
individuals from invoking the treaties as a defense to a criminal prosecution.
It is beyond the scope of this article to respond to this argument in detail. One
point merits brief discussion, though. If Congress decides to enact legislation explicitly
superseding the Geneva Conventions, then Congress is accountable for that political
decision. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, though, Congress reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. See § 948b(f) (specifying that "[a]
military commission established under this chapter" satisfies the requirements "of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions"). If the Supreme Court applies the Act in a manner
that precludes any judicial review of claims alleging violations of the Geneva Conventions,
then the Court would effectively permit the executive branch to violate the Geneva
Conventions without any accountability. Thus, the Court might reject the "greater includes
the lesser" argument noted above to ensure that one of the federal political branches is
accountable for a decision to violate the Geneva Conventions.
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join the majority opinion in the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan strongly
suggests that Chief Justice Roberts is prepared to endorse the nation-
alist presumption against judicial remedies. Similarly, Justice Tho-
mas's dissent in the Supreme Court in Hamdan suggests that Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are likely to endorse the nationalist pre-
sumption. Thus, the current Justices are apparently divided 4-4 be-
tween those who support the transnationalist model and those who
support the nationalist model. In a future case presenting the issue, if
the composition of the Court does not change in the interim, Justice
Kennedy will likely provide the crucial swing vote. Based upon his
comments during oral argument in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas,140
his separate concurrence in Hamdan,141 and his silent agreement with
the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas,142 it appears that Justice
Kennedy is reluctant to endorse either the nationalist or the transna-
tionalist approach.
Since the Supreme Court is likely to address the conflict be-
tween the nationalist and transnationalist models in the near future,
and since the Court's understanding of history will likely influence
its resolution of that conflict, the rest of this article examines the his-
torical basis for the two models.
IV. THE TRANSNATIONALIST MODEL IN ACTION: 1789-1838
Part Four presents a comprehensive analysis of Supreme
Court decisions between 1789 and 1838 in which an individual liti-
gant raised a claim or defense on the basis of a treaty. The year 1838
provides an appropriate closing date for this analysis. Modem pro-
ponents of the nationalist presumption against judicial remedies rely
heavily on Chief Justice Marshall's 1829 opinion in Foster v. Neil-
son 143 to support that presumption. 144 In Garcia v. Lee,145 decided in
1838, Chief Justice Taney authored an opinion that helps illuminate
140. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184)
(Mar. 28, 2006); Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (No.
04-10566) (Mar. 29, 2006), both available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oralarguments/argument transcripts.html.
141. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799-809 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
142. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
143. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
144. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing
Foster); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (citing Foster); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005) (citing
Foster).
145. Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
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Marshall's inscrutable analysis in Foster. Thus, to obtain a clear un-
derstanding of Marshall's opinion in Foster-and to demonstrate
conclusively that Foster provides no support for the nationalist
model-it is essential to analyze the aftermath of Foster up through
and including Taney's 1838 decision in Garcia v. Lee.
Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided fifty-
eight cases in which an individual litigant raised a claim or defense
on the basis of a treaty. 146 These fifty-eight cases include: twenty-
two cases involving disputes over title to property in Louisiana or
Florida (territories that the United States acquired by treaties with
France and Spain, respectively); sixteen other cases involving dis-
putes over title to real property; twelve admiralty cases; and eight
cases that are neither admiralty nor property cases.
Part Four analyzes the results of Supreme Court decisions
during this period to determine which results are consistent with the
transnationalist model and which results are consistent with the na-
tionalist model. Since few cases explicitly endorse the core premises
of either model, it is necessary to examine what the Court did, as well
as what the Court said. The analysis exposes the unstated assump-
tions that actually guided the Court's decision-making in treaty cases
during this period. Part Four demonstrates that every Supreme Court
decision during this period was consistent with the transnationalist
146. This figure does not include cases involving treaties with Indian tribes. Only cases
involving treaties with foreign nations are included.
During the period before John Marshall became Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
decided numerous cases without issuing a published decision. The Court probably relied on
treaties to supply the rule of decision in many of those cases. See JuLIus GOEBEL, JR.,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 812 (1971) (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court of the United States Vol. 1) (indicating that thirty-one of the
seventy-nine cases disposed by the Supreme Court before 1801 involved treaties). The
figure of fifty-eight cases cited in the text includes only published Supreme Court opinions
that reference a treaty.
Cases where an individual plaintiff invoked a treaty in reply to a defense raised by
the defendant are included. However, cases where the Court cited a treaty as evidence
supporting a contested proposition, but where neither party asserted an individual right on
the basis of that treaty, are excluded. See, e.g., Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
523 (1827) (where neither party asserted an individual right on the basis of the peace treaty
between the United States and Britain, the Court cited the treaty as evidence that the land at
issue was part of the United States in 1777).
The phrase "individual litigant" includes companies as well as natural persons.
See, e.g., Soc'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
464 (1823) (suit by British corporation). It also includes individual officials of foreign
governments who file suit to represent the interests of their government, or of their country's
nationals. See, e.g., The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819) (petition filed by
Spanish consul on behalf of Spanish nationals). Since the article focuses on treaty
enforcement by individual litigants, cases where the adverse parties are both government
entities are excluded. See, e.g., New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
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presumption in favor of judicial remedies. In contrast, none of the
fifty-eight cases endorse the nationalist presumption against private
enforcement of treaties. Moreover, there was not a single Supreme
Court decision during this period suggesting that individuals cannot
enforce treaties in the absence of a statutory or treaty-based right of
action. In sum, the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium 47 was a key un-
stated assumption that the Court simply took for granted; the Su-
preme Court's decisions in treaty cases during this period did not de-
viate from this principle. 148
Part Four is divided into four sections. The first section ana-
lyzes cases in which the party invoking the treaty won on the merits
of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total of thirty-six cases. The
second section addresses cases where the Court declined to reach the
merits of a treaty-based claim or defense, a total of nine cases. The
third section discusses cases in which the party invoking the treaty
lost on the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense; there were thir-
teen such cases. The final section examines one of those thirteen
cases, Foster v. Neilson, in greater detail.
A. Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Won on the Merits
Of the fifty-eight treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided
between 1789 and 1838, the individual invoking the treaty won his
treaty-based claim or defense thirty-six times. 149 Those thirty-six
cases are all consistent with the transnationalist model because, in
each case, the Court enforced the treaty on behalf of an individual
litigant. To determine whether the cases are consistent with the na-
147. This is a Latin maxim that means "where there is a right, there is a remedy."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
148. Of the fifty-eight treaty cases that the Supreme Court decided during this period,
only three create a slight right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties: Strother v. Lucas,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); and De la Croix
v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599 (1827). For the reasons explained below, all three
are consistent with the transnationalist model. See infra text accompanying notes 279-87
and 293-358.
149. If a party who invokes a treaty wins the case, but loses on the treaty issue, that
counts as a loss. See, e.g., Soc'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 480 (1830) (where British company filed ejectment action against town, Court
affirmed plaintiff's right to recover possession of land, but rejected plaintiffs treaty-based
claim for mesne profits). If both parties assert rights under a treaty, and one party wins its
treaty-based claim or defense, that counts as a win. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 133 (1795) (where Dutch ship owners sought to recover property captured by
privateers who claimed to be French, and captors invoked treaty with France as a bar to
Court's jurisdiction, the Court rejected the jurisdictional objection and ruled in favor of
Dutch ship owners on the basis of a treaty with the Netherlands).
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tionalist presumption against judicial remedies, it is essential to de-
termine whether the individual invoking the treaty had a statutory or
treaty-based right of action. Since the Court almost never addressed
this question in its opinions, it is necessary to look beyond the text of
the opinions. 50  The cases divide into four groups: twelve cases
where the individual litigant had a statutory right of action; 151 three
cases where the treaty provided an express private right of action;152
fifteen cases that are clearly inconsistent with the nationalist model
because the Court awarded remedies on the basis of a treaty even
though there was no statutory or treaty-based right of action;153 and
six cases that are arguably inconsistent with the nationalist model be-
cause there was no statutory right of action, and it is debatable
whether the treaty created a private right of action. 154
1. Cases Involving a Statutory Right of Action
The United States acquired Louisiana from France by a treaty
signed in 1803.155 Under Article 3 of that treaty, the United States
promised that "[t]he inhabitants of the ceded territory . . .shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their . . . prop-
erty."'1 56 At the time of the acquisition, many individuals had private
property rights based upon grants received from prior French and
Spanish governments. Congress, therefore, enacted legislation in
1805 that authorized the President to appoint commissioners to con-
duct hearings and review evidence for the purpose of distinguishing
between valid and invalid property claims. 157 Over the next two dec-
ades, Congress passed a series of laws regulating titles to land in the
territory acquired from France.158 Ultimately, in 1824, Congress cre-
ated a federal statutory cause of action authorizing individuals who
150. The fact that the vast majority of Supreme Court opinions during this period did
not even consider whether the treaty at issue provided a private right of action is itself
compelling evidence that the Court did not endorse or apply the nationalist methodology.
151. See infra Part IV.A(1).
152. See infra Part IV.A(2).
153. See infra Part IV.A(3).
154. See infra Part IV.A(4).
155. Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, reprinted in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 498 (Hunter
Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931) [hereinafter Louisiana Treaty].
156. Id. art. 3.
157. Act of Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 26, § 5, 2 Stat. 324, 327-28.
158. See Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to Louisiana, 43
Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 39, 43-46, 51-53 (1956); Harry L. Coles, Jr., The Confirmation of
Foreign Land Titles in Louisiana, 1955 LA. HIST. Q. 1, 1-22 (Oct. 1955). See also Act of
Mar. 2, 1805, ch. 26, 2 Stat. 324, 324-25 n.(a) (summarizing legislation from 1804 to 1844).
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claimed property rights "protected or secured by the treaty between
the United States of America and the French republic ... to present a
petition to the district court of the state of Missouri .... -159 During
the 1830s, the Supreme Court decided three cases where plaintiffs as-
serting a claim on the basis of this federal statute won on the merits
of those claims.160
The United States acquired Florida from Spain by a treaty
signed in 1819.161 Under Article 8 of that treaty, the United States
promised to respect the property rights of individuals who had valid
titles based on prior Spanish land grants. 62 Congress wanted to im-
plement that treaty obligation, while simultaneously establishing
safeguards to prevent the distribution of large tracts of land to indi-
viduals with fraudulent claims. Accordingly, in 1822 Congress en-
acted legislation authorizing the President to appoint commissioners
to conduct hearings and review evidence for the purpose of distin-
guishing between valid and invalid property claims. 163 The initial
statutory scheme was purely administrative, with no provision for ju-
dicial review. In 1828, however, Congress created a federal statutory
cause of action for individuals who claimed property rights protected
by Article 8 of the Florida Treaty.164 During the 1830s, the Supreme
Court decided nine cases in which plaintiffs asserting a claim on the
basis of this federal statute won on the merits of their treaty-based
159. Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 173, § 1, 2 Stat. 52, 52. The statute says, in relevant part:
That it shall and may be lawful for any person ... claiming lands ... within the
state of Missouri, by virtue of any French or Spanish grant . ..which was
protected or secured by the treaty between the United States of America and
the French republic ... to present a petition to the district court of the state of
Missouri... and the said court is hereby authorized and required to hold and
exercise jurisdiction of every petition, presented in conformity with the
provisions of this act ....
160. Mackey v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 340 (1836); Soulard's Heirs v. United
States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 100 (1836); Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 117 (1835).
161. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, reprinted in 3
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Hunter
Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1933) [hereinafter Florida Treaty].
162. Id. art. 8 ("All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by His
Catholic Majesty or by his lawful authorities in the said Territories ceded by His Majesty to
the United-States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands...
(footnote omitted)).
163. See Act of May 8, 1822, ch. 129, 3 Stat. 709.
164. See Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 70, 4 Stat. 284. Section 6 of the Act states:
That all claims to land within the territory of Florida, embraced by the treaty
between Spain and the United States ... shall be received and adjudicated by
the judge of the superior court of the district within which the land lies, upon
the petition of the claimant, according to the forms, rules, regulations,
conditions, restrictions, and limitations prescribed to the district judge, and
claimants in the state of Missouri, by act of Congress, approved May twenty-
sixth, eighteen hundred and twenty-four ....
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claims. 165
All twelve cases where plaintiffs prevailed (three Missouri
cases and nine Florida cases) are consistent with the transnationalist
model because the Court granted remedies to the individual plaintiffs
to protect their treaty-based rights. All twelve cases are also consis-
tent with the nationalist model because Congress had enacted federal
statutes authorizing judicial enforcement of those claims. Even so,
none of the cases endorse the nationalist presumption against private
enforcement of treaties.
2. Cases Involving an Express Treaty-Based Right of Action
In Higginson v. Mein,166 a British mortgagee sued to foreclose
on a mortgage related to land in Georgia. The State of Georgia had
confiscated the mortgaged property during the Revolutionary War. 167
The British plaintiff invoked Article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of
Peace, which protected the rights of "all Persons who have any Inter-
est in confiscated Lands, either by Debts, Marriage Settlements, or
otherwise.' 68 Article 5 granted the plaintiff an express private right
of action. The treaty stipulated: "And it is agreed that all Persons
who have any Interest in confiscated Lands ... shall meet with no
lawful Impediment in the Prosecution of their just Rights."' 169 The
Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff.
Bello Corrunes170 and Pizarro'7' were both admiralty cases
165. United States v. Sibbald, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 313 (1836); United States v. Seton, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 309 (1836); United States v. Fernandez, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 303 (1836); Mitchel
v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); United States v. Clarke, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 168
(1835); United States v. Huertas, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 488 (1834) (plaintiff wins claim for 11,000
acres but loses claim for 4000 acres); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834)
(plaintiff wins claim for 8000 acres but loses claim for other land); United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691
(1832).
166. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415 (1808).
167. See id. at 418-19.
168. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 5, Sept. 3, 1783, reprinted in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 151, 154
(Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931).
169. Id. Thus, the treaty specifically authorizes those "who have any Interest in
confiscated Lands" to prosecute "their just rights" in the confiscated lands, which are
restored by Article 5. It is difficult to imagine what else the treaty drafters would have to
say in order to satisfy the nationalist requirement for a private right of action. In contrast,
neither Article 4 nor Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace creates an express private
right of action. For analysis of those articles, see infra notes 216-36, 247-58 and
accompanying text.
170. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152 (1821).
171. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227 (1817).
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involving disputes between U.S. captors and Spanish ship-owners. In
both cases, Article XX of the 1795 Treaty with Spain granted Span-
ish ship owners an express private right of action authorizing suits in
U.S. courts. The treaty stated: "It is also agreed that the inhabitants
of the territories of each Party shall respectively have free access to
the Courts of Justice of the other, and they shall be permitted to
prosecute suits for the recovery of their properties ... and for obtain-
ing satisfaction for the damages which they may have sustained...
9172 In both cases, the Court awarded judgment to the Spanish ship
owners on the grounds that American privateers who captured the
ships had violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain.17 3
Higginson, Bello Corrunes, and Pizarro are all consistent
with the transnationalist model because, in each case, the Court
awarded a remedy to an individual victim of a treaty violation. All
three cases are also consistent with the nationalist model because the
treaties at issue granted the individual litigants an express private
right of action. None of these cases, however, endorse the nationalist
presumption against private enforcement of treaties. Moreover, none
of the cases state or imply that individual litigants could not have en-
forced the treaty in the absence of a treaty-based right of action.
3. Cases in Which There Was No Express Private Right of
Action
The Supreme Court decided fifteen cases between 1789 and
1838 in which an individual litigant won on the merits of a treaty-
based claim or defense, even though the treaty at issue did not create
an express private right of action and Congress had not enacted legis-
lation authorizing private enforcement of the treaty in domestic
courts. The fifteen cases include five admiralty cases, 174 five cases
172. Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, art. 20, Oct. 27, 1795,
reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 318, 334-35 (Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931) [hereinafter 1795
Treaty with Spain].
173. See Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 171-72 (holding that the privateer had
violated Article XIV of the 1795 Treaty with Spain), 154-55 (noting that the Circuit court
had ordered restoration of the ship to the Spanish owners), 175-76 (affirming the Circuit
court order in all relevant respects); Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 242-47 (holding that the
capture violated Article XV of the 1795 Treaty with Spain and ordering restitution of the
ship to the Spanish owners).
174. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801); Moodie v. Ship
Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796); Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121
(1795).
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involving creditor-debtor disputes, 175 and five other cases. 176 In all
fifteen cases, the Court applied the transnationalist presumption in
favor of judicial remedies. In every case, the Court would have
reached a different result if it had applied the nationalist presumption.
Consequently, these cases are clearly inconsistent with the nationalist
model; they provide strong support for the transnationalist model.
a. Admiralty Cases
In the years 1795 and 1796, the Supreme Court decided four
admiralty cases in which the Court enforced a treaty on behalf of an
individual litigant, despite the fact that the treaty at issue did not cre-
ate an express private right of action: Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne,
Geyer v. Michel, Talbot v. Jansen, and United States v. Peters. 177 All
four cases arose in the context of a naval war between France and
other European powers.
Talbot v. Jansen involved a Dutch brigantine, the Magdalena,
which had been captured by privateers. 178 The Dutch ship owners
argued that the capture violated a 1782 treaty between the United
States and The Netherlands.179 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the Dutch ship owners,18 0 producing four separate opinions in support
of that result. Two of the four opinions expressly held that the cap-
ture violated the 1782 Treaty with The Netherlands, and that the ship
175. Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 164 (1807) (Hopkirk II); Hopkirkv. Bell, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 454 (1806) (Hopkirk I); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
176. Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1 (1830); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
181 (1825); Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 464 (1823); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817); Fitzsimmons v.
Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185 (1808).
177. See the cases cited supra note 174.
178. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
179. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., art. 19, Oct. 8, 1782, reprinted in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 59, 76-77
(Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931) [hereinafter 1782 Treaty with Netherlands].
Article 19 prohibited U.S. citizens from accepting a commission from any state at war with
The Netherlands "for arming any Ship or Ships, to act as Privateers" against Dutch ships.
One of the captors, Talbot, was allegedly a U.S. citizen who had accepted a commission
from France, which was at war with The Netherlands. Talbot claimed that Article 19 did not
apply to him because he had renounced his U.S. citizenship and acquired French citizenship.
Justice Paterson, who wrote one of the two main opinions in the case, would have resolved
the case on other grounds without deciding whether Talbot was a French citizen. See Talbot,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 152-58 (Paterson, J., plurality opinion). Justice Iredell, who wrote the
other main opinion in the case, held squarely that Talbot was a U.S. citizen. See id. at 161-
65 (Iredell, J., plurality opinion).
180. Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 169.
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owners were entitled to a remedy on that basis.' 81 The Court granted
a remedy to the ship owners, even though the treaty at issue did not
create an express private right of action, 182 and there was no federal
statute, other than the general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that au-
thorized the ship owners to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court. 183
In Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne, a French privateer captured a
British vessel. The British Consul filed a libel, seeking restitution on
the ground that the French privateer had illegally augmented the ves-
sel's force in a U.S. port. 184 In response, the privateer invoked Arti-
cle 19 of a 1778 treaty with France, 185 which granted the privateer a
right to enter a U.S. port for repairs. The Court held that the treaty
protected the privateer's activities in this case.'8 6 Accordingly, the
Court awarded judgment to the French privateer on the basis of the
treaty, even though the treaty at issue did not create an express pri-
vate right of action,187 and there was no federal statute that authorized
the privateer to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court.
In United States v. Peters, the commander of a French war-
ship filed a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court to prevent Rich-
ard Peters, the district judge for the District of Pennsylvania, from
exercising jurisdiction over a libel filed in that court by James
181. See id. at 165 (Iredell, J., plurality opinion) (concluding that Talbot breached his
"duty of not cruising against the Dutch, in violation of the law of nations, generally, and of
the treaty with Holland, in particular"); id. at 169 (Rutledge, C.J., plurality opinion) (stating
that the capture "was a violation of the law of nations, and of the treaty with Holland").
182. Article 19 expressly provides that any individual who violates its terms "shall be
punished as a Pirate." 1782 Treaty with Netherlands, supra note 179. The treaty does not
provide for civil actions against individuals who commit acts of piracy. See id.
183. The statute conferring admiralty jurisdiction empowered federal courts to
adjudicate admiralty disputes, but it did not expressly empower the Dutch ship owners to
invoke the treaty. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (granting district
courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction"). From an eighteenth-century viewpoint, though, the absence of an express
private right of action was immaterial. Every person with an admiralty claim had a right of
access to court to enforce that claim, and every person whose treaty-based primary rights
were violated had a power to invoke the treaty before a court. This eighteenth-century logic
does not apply to modem cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because a plaintiff bringing
suit under that jurisdictional statute must usually identify some other source of federal law
that grants him a right of access to court.
184. See Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 319 (1796).
185. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., art. 19, Feb. 6, 1778, reprinted in 2
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3, 17-18
(Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931) [hereinafter 1778 Treaty with France].
186. See Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 319.
187. Article 19 of the 1778 treaty with France protects the right of French mariners who
seek shelter in U.S. ports to obtain "all things needful for.., reparation of their Ships" and
to "depart when and whither they please without any let or hindrance." 1778 Treaty with
France, supra note 185. The treaty does not contain any language that expressly empowers
French citizens to invoke that provision before a U.S. court.
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Yard. 188 In his libel in the district court, Yard alleged that he was the
owner of the schooner William Lindsey, which had been captured il-
legally by a French warship, the Cassius, and taken to Port de Paix (a
French port). 189 When the Cassius subsequently returned to Phila-
delphia (while the William Lindsey was still in Port de Paix), Yard
filed a libel and moved to attach the Cassius in an effort to secure
compensation for the damages he sustained as a result of the alleg-
edly illegal capture of the William Lindsey. 90 Samuel Davis, the
commander of the Cassius, responded by filing a writ of prohibition
in the Supreme Court. 191 The Supreme Court granted the writ, 192
holding that the 1778 treaty with France' 93 precluded the district
court from exercising jurisdiction in a case where a French warship
had captured an American vessel and taken the captured vessel to a
French port. 194 Again, the Court awarded judgment on the basis of
the treaty, even though the treaty did not create an express private
right of action, and there was no federal statute that authorized Davis
to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Geyer v. Michel addressed
two separate cases. One involved a Dutch ship (the Den Onzekeren)
captured by a French privateer. The other involved a British ship
(The Betty Cathcart) captured by the same French privateer. 195 In
both cases, agents of the owners filed libels in federal district court in
South Carolina, seeking restitution of the captured prizes. 196 The
French captor invoked Article 17 of the 1778 treaty with France as a
bar to the district court's jurisdiction. 97 Judge Thomas Bee, who
was the federal district judge in South Carolina, issued a published
188. See 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 121, 121-25 (1795).
189. Id. at 121-22.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 122-23.
192. Id. at 129.
193. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 185. The Court's opinion in Peters refers
generally to "the treaties subsisting between the United States and the Republic of France," 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) at 129, but other contemporaneous cases make it clear that the Court was
relying on Article 17 of the 1778 Treaty with France. See infra notes 195-204 and
accompanying text.
194. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 129-32. The Court also invoked the law of nations in
support of its conclusion.
195. See Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 285, 286-89 (1796). See also Minutes of the
Supreme Court, Mar. 3, 1796, reprinted in 7 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 63, 75-76 (1963) (noting
that the two cases "were agreed by Counsel to be argued together as depending upon similar
principles").
196. See Geyer, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 286; Moodie v. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651
(D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742).
197. Geyer, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 287.
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decision in The Betty Cathcart on April 27, 1795;198 his decision in
The Den Onzekeren was unpublished. Before issuing his decision in
The Betty Cathcart, Judge Bee had published decisions in eight other
cases in which he held that Article 17 of the 1778 treaty with France
precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over prize
cases involving French privateers who captured enemy ships on the
high seas. 199 Thus, by the time Judge Bee decided The Den On-
zekeren and the The Betty Cathcart, it was well established that Arti-
cle 17 gave French privateers a valid defense to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts.
200
However, the libellants in The Den Onzekeren and The Betty
Cathcart raised a novel argument; they alleged that the French priva-
teer had illegally augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of
U.S. neutrality laws.20' Judge Bee ruled in favor of the libellants on
this basis, reasoning that the French privateer effectively waived its
immunity to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by breaching U.S. neutral-
ity laws. 20 2 After obtaining additional evidence, the Circuit Court re-
versed Judge Bee's decisions on factual grounds, concluding that the
French privateer had not illegally augmented its force.20 3 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the Circuit Court decision without stating its
rationale. 20 4 Even so, the rationale is clear in light of the historical
198. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651.
199. See British Consul v. The Mermaid, 4 F. Cas. 169 (D.S.C. Apr. 3, 1795) (No.
1897); Williamson v. The Betsy, 30 F. Cas. 7 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 1795) (No. 17,750); Moodie
v. The Brothers, 17 F. Cas. 653 (D.S.C. Mar. 1795) (No. 9743); Reid v. The Vere, 20 F. Cas.
488 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 1795) (No. 11,670); Salderondo v. Nostra Signora del Camino, 21 F.
Cas. 225 (D.S.C. Sept. 1794) (No. 12,247); Stannick v. The Friendship, 22 F. Cas. 1056
(D.S.C. Aug. 1794) (No. 13,291); British Consul v. The Favorite, 4 F. Cas. 169 (D.S.C.
1794) (No. 1896) (published as a note to United States v. The Hawke, 26 F. Cas. 233
(D.S.C. 1794) (No. 15,331)); Castello v. Bouteille, 5 F. Cas. 278 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 2504).
200. Article 17 provides:
It shall be lawful for the Ships of War of either Party & Privateers freely to
carry whithersoever they please the Ships and Goods taken from their Enemies,
without being obliged to pay any Duty to the Officers of the Admiralty or any
other Judges; nor shall such Prizes be arrested or seized, when they come to
and enter the Ports of either Party; nor shall the Searchers or other Officers of
those Places search the same or make examination concerning the Lawfulness
of such Prizes, but they may hoist Sail at any time and depart and carry their
Prizes to the Places express'd in their Commissions ....
1778 Treaty with France, supra note 185.
201. Geyer, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 286-87; The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. at 651-53. This
was not the first time Judge Bee addressed the argument that a French privateer had illegally
augmented its force in a U.S. port. See British Consul v. The Nancy, 4 F. Cas. 171 (D.S.C.
1795) (No. 1898) (ordering restitution of prize and cargo on the grounds that French
privateer augmented its force in a U.S. port in violation of U.S. neutrality).
202. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. at 653.
203. Geyer, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 289-93.
204. Id. at 296.
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context: absent proof that the privateer had illegally augmented its
force, Article 17 of the 1778 treaty precluded U.S. courts from exer-
cising jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court enforced Article 17 on be-
half of the French privateer, even though the treaty did not create an
express private right of action, and there was no federal statute that
authorized the privateer to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court.20 5
In United States v. Schooner Peggy,206 the Court ruled in fa-
vor of the French owners of a schooner captured by a U.S. naval ves-
sel, holding that Article 4 of an 1800 Convention with France granted
the French owners a right to recover the captured property. 207 Article
4 granted the French owners a primary right to regain possession of
the ship, but it did not explicitly empower them to enforce that right
in a U.S. court. 208 Nor was there any federal statute, other than the
general grant of admiralty jurisdiction, that authorized the French
ship owners to enforce the treaty in a U.S. court. One could argue
that Article 22 of the 1800 Convention with France granted the
French ship owners a private right of action.209 It is clear from the
historical context, however, that Article 22 was not intended to create
a private right of action. 210 Moreover, even if one reads Article 22 to
create a right of action, it is questionable whether that right of action
applied to cases, such as Schooner Peggy, implicating Article 4 of the
treaty. 211
205. Id.
206. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108-10 (1801).
207. Id.
208. Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America, U.S.-
Fr., art. 4, Sept. 30, 1800, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 457, 459-62 (Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931)
[hereinafter 1800 Convention with France] ("[P]roperty captured, and not yet definitively
condemned... shall be mutually restored.").
209. See id. art. 22 ("It is further agreed that in all cases, the established courts for Prize
Causes, in the Country to which the prizes may be conducted, shall alone take cognizance of
them.").
210. In the 1790s, the French Ambassador had instructed French consuls in the United
States to exercise jurisdiction over prize cases in which French privateers captured enemy
vessels and brought them into U.S. ports. See CHARLES MARION THOMAS, AMERICAN
NEUTRALITY IN 1793, at 206-11 (1967). The United States objected strenuously to this
practice. See id. Article 22 thus codified France's acknowledgment that U.S. courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over prize cases involving captured vessels brought to the United
States.
211. The 1800 Convention with France served two distinct goals. First, it was a peace
treaty that terminated the undeclared war between the United States and France. Articles 1-
5 were backward-looking and were intended to codify the termination of the war.
Meanwhile, Articles 6-27 were forward-looking and were designed to govern future
relations. Hence, the word "cases" in Article 22 may have been intended to include only the
admiralty cases addressed in Articles 6-27, not the cases implicating Article 4, which
addressed property captured during the war. See 1800 Convention with France, supra note
208.
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In any case, the Court's opinion in Schooner Peggy makes no
reference to Article 22, and does not rely on that treaty provision as a
basis for a private right of action. Rather, the Court's rationale was
that "[t]he court is as much bound as the executive to take notice of a
treaty, and will . . . decree restoration of the property under the
treaty. ' 212 In accordance with the transnationalist model, the Court
assumed that Article 4 was judicially enforceable by private parties,
even though that article did not expressly empower individuals to in-
voke the treaty before a U.S. court. Chief Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, stated:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty
to be the supreme law of the land. Of consequence its
obligation on the courts of the United States must be
admitted.... [W]here a treaty is the law of the land,
and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in
court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as
much to be regarded by the court as an act of con-
gress; and.. . to condemn a vessel, the restoration of
which is directed by a law of the land, would be a di-
rect infraction of that law, and of consequence, im-
proper.213
In Marshall's view, it was immaterial whether the treaty created a
private right of action because the Court had a duty under the Su-
premacy Clause to enforce the treaty on behalf of the French ship
owners.
Talbot, Phoebe Anne, Peters, Geyer, and Schooner Peggy are
all consistent with the transnationalist model, but they are squarely
inconsistent with the nationalist model. In accordance with the
transnationalist model, the Court assumed that the treaties at issue
were judicially enforceable on behalf of private parties, even though
the treaties did not create an express private right of action.214 Con-
trary to the nationalist model, the absence of any statutory or treaty
provision that expressly authorized private enforcement was not a bar
to private enforcement of the treaty.
212. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 103-04.
213. Id. at 109-10 (Marshall, C.J.).
214. See, e.g., Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 319, 319 (1796) (Elsworth,
C.J.) ("Suggestions of policy and conveniency cannot be considered in the judicial
determination of a question of right: the Treaty with France ... must have its effect.").
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b. Creditor-Debtor Disputes
During the period under study, the Supreme Court decided
five cases in which it awarded judgment to British creditors on the
basis of Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. 215 Ware v. Hyl-
ton216 is representative of these cases. In Ware, a British creditor
sued U.S. debtors to collect payment on a bond that dated from
1774.217 In 1777, during the Revolutionary War, the Virginia legisla-
ture "passed a law to sequester British property. '2 18 In 1780, pursu-
ant to that Virginia law, the U.S. debtors paid a portion of their debt
into a loan office established by the State of Virginia.219 After the
war was over, when the British creditor sued to recover payment on
the bond, the defendants pled the Virginia law, and their payment
into the loan office, as a bar to the suit.220 In reply to that defense,
the plaintiff invoked Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.22'
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the British plaintiff, holding that
"the 4th article of the said treaty nullifies the law of Virginia... ; de-
stroys the payment made under it; and revives the debt .... -222 The
Court applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies, granting a remedy to the British plaintiff, despite the fact
that neither the treaty nor a federal statute granted the plaintiff a pri-
vate right of action.223
In addition to Ware, the Supreme Court decided three other
cases implicating Article 4 in which British creditors sued U.S. debt-
ors to recover debts that had been confiscated or sequestered during
the Revolutionary War.224 In one other case, the State of Georgia
sued a British creditor, and the creditor invoked Article 4 defensively
to assert his entitlement to a debt sequestered during the war. 225 In
215. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
216. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
217. Id. at 199.
218. Id. at 220 (Chase, J.).
219. Id. at 221.
220. Id.
221. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 4 ("Creditors on either Side shall
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all
bona fide Debts heretofore contracted.").
222. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 235 (Chase, J.).
223. The plaintiffs suit was based on the common law right of action to recover
payment on a bond.
224. Hopkirk v. Bell (Hopkirk I), 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 164 (1807); Hopkirk v. Bell
(Hopkirk 1), 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272
(1804).
225. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 1 (1794).
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all the cases, the Court ruled in favor of the British creditors. 226 Like
Ware, these cases are inconsistent with the nationalist model because
the Court granted remedies to British creditors even though Article 4
did not grant the creditors a private right of action, and there was no
federal statute that empowered British creditors to invoke the treaty
before a U.S. court.
Defenders of the nationalist model might contend that Article
4 does create a private right of action. The treaty states explicitly
"that Creditors on either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment
to the recovery ... of all bona fide Debts heretofore contracted. '227
This language, one could argue, manifests the drafters' expectation
that private individuals could enforce the treaty in domestic courts.
Moreover, the Court stated explicitly in Ware that the phrase "to the
Recovery" refers "to the right of action, judgment, and execution...
The word recovery is very comprehensive and operates, in the pre-
sent case, to give remedy from the commencement of suit, to the re-
ceipt of the money. '228 Thus, one could argue, Ware and the other
Article 4 cases are consistent with the nationalist model because they
are cases where the treaty itself created a private right of action.
This argument is not persuasive. The express language of Ar-
ticle 4 says nothing about courts or lawsuits; it merely refers to re-
covery of debts. Hart and Sacks would characterize Article 4 as a
primary rule because it specifies what the treaty drafters expect "to
happen when the arrangement works successfully. '229 It is not a re-
medial rule because it does not specify "that a certain consequence,
or sanction, may or shall follow upon . . . noncompliance with the
relevant primary provision. '230 In this respect, Article 4 differs
markedly from provisions of other contemporaneous treaties that cre-
ate an express private right of action. Unlike those treaty provisions
that expressly require enforcement in domestic courts, 231 the United
226. Hopkirk II, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 164 (reaffirming Hopkirk I); Hopkirk 1, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 454 (ordering debtor to pay debt wrongfully withheld from creditor in violation of
Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace); Ogden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (same);
Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (holding that Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace
protected British defendant's right to recover debt).
227. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 4.
228. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 241 (1796). See also Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 5 ("[T]he very terms of the treaty, revived the right of action to recover the debt...
229. HART & SACKS, supra note 24, at 122.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., 1795 Treaty with Spain, supra note 172, art. 20 ("It is also agreed that the
inhabitants of the territories of each Party shall respectively have free access to the Courts of
Justice of the other, and they shall be permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their
properties ... and for obtaining satisfaction for the damages which they may have sustained
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States could have fulfilled its obligations under Article 4 without any
judicial involvement. 232
Perhaps more importantly, Article 4 of the Definitive Treaty
of Peace is virtually indistinguishable from Article 36(2) of the
VCCR, the treaty provision at issue in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.233
Whereas Article 4 specifies that creditors "shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full value" of debts,234 Article
36(2) specifies that U.S. "laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended. ' 235 Both provisions, in essence, say that states
parties cannot interpose domestic law as an obstacle to prevent indi-
viduals whose rights are protected by the treaty from deriving the full
benefit of those rights. Courts applying the nationalist model have
uniformly held that Article 36(2) of the VCCR does not authorize ju-
dicial enforcement on behalf of private individuals.236 Defenders of
the nationalist model cannot have it both ways. Their claim that Ar-
ticle 36(2) does not authorize domestic judicial enforcement contra-
dicts the argument that Ware and the other Article 4 cases are consis-
tent with the nationalist model.
In light of these observations, consider again the Court's
statement in Ware that the word "recovery" in Article 4 refers "to the
right of action ... and operates, in the present case, to give remedy
232. In fact, the United States later agreed on non-judicial means to implement its
obligations under Article 4 because British creditors had ongoing problems enforcing their
rights in U.S. courts. See GOEBEL, supra note 146, at 741-56 (recounting history of efforts
by British creditors to recover pre-war debts). The United States agreed in the 1794 Jay
Treaty that "[t]he United States will make full and complete Compensation for" debts owed
by U.S. citizens to British creditors. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-
Gr. Brit., art. 6, Nov. 19, 1794, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 245, 250 (Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1931)
[hereinafter Jay Treaty]. Moreover, the treaty established a bilateral U.S.-British arbitral
tribunal that provided a non-judicial forum where British creditors could enforce their rights
protected by Article 4 of the peace treaty. Id. The tribunal ceased operations in 1798, but
the United States and Great Britain concluded a new treaty in 1802 "by which the United
States agreed to pay the sum of £600,000 in satisfaction of claims for pre-war debts."
GOEBEL, supra note 146, at 756.
233. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
234. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 4.
235. VCCR, supra note 65, art. 36(2).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 388-94 (6th Cir. 2001)
(applying the nationalist presumption against judicial enforcement and concluding on that
basis "that the Vienna Convention does not create a right for a detained foreign national ...
that the federal courts can enforce"); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195-98
(5th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66-68 (1st Cir. 2000) (Selya, J. &
Boudin, J. concurring) (same).
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from the commencement of suit, to the receipt of the money." 237
This statement, viewed in the proper historical context, manifests the
Court's tacit assumption that "where there is a right, there is a rem-
edy." Article 4, by its terms, creates a primary duty for debtors to
pay and a correlative primary right for creditors to be paid. 23 8 The
Court inferred, on the basis of this primary rule, that creditors must
have a judicial remedy in cases where debtors refuse to pay their
debts, because the Court assumed the validity and applicability of the
maxim ubijus, ibi remedium. In short, the Court applied the transna-
tionalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies.
c. Other Cases that Are Inconsistent with the Nationalist Model
During the period under study, the Court decided five other
cases that are inconsistent with the nationalist presumption against
judicial remedies for treaty violations.
In Chirac v. Chirac,239 the French heirs of John Baptiste
Chirac brought an action for ejectment to gain possession of real es-
tate in Maryland. If the Court had applied Maryland law, the land
would have escheated to the state. 240 In support of their action for
ejectment, the French heirs invoked Article 7 of the 1800 Convention
with France, which protected the rights of French subjects holding
property in the United States. 24' Neither Article 7 nor any other pro-
vision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiffs to enforce
the treaty in a domestic court. Regardless, Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding
that the treaty "does away the incapacity of alienage, and places the
237. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 241.
238. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 4 ("Creditors on either Side shall
meet with no lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all
bona fide Debts heretofore contracted."). A remedial rule, creating a private right of action,
would have specified that if debtors refuse to pay, creditors may bring suit to enforce their
rights.
239. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
240. Id. at 273-74.
241. 1800 Convention with France, supra note 208, art. 7 ("The Citizens, and
inhabitants of the United States shall be at liberty to dispose by testament, donation, or
otherwise, of their goods, moveable, and immoveable, holden in the territory of the French
Republic in Europe, and the Citizens of the French Republic, shall have the same liberty
with regard to goods, moveable, and immoveable, holden in the territory of the United
States, in favor of such persons as they shall think proper. The Citizens and inhabitants of
either of the two countries, who shall be heirs of goods, moveable, or immoveable in the
other shall be able to succeed ab intestato, without being obliged to obtain letters of
naturalization, and without having the effect of this provision contested or impeded under
any pretext whatever.").
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defendants in error in precisely the same situation, with respect to
lands, as if they had become citizens. '242
In Carneal v. Banks,243 the plaintiff sued to rescind a land
swap contract with defendants. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that de-
fendants did not have a valid title to the land they promised to trans-
fer because their title was derived from Lacassaign, a French na-
tional, whose alienage precluded him from conveying title to the
property.244 In response, defendants invoked Article 11 of the 1778
Treaty with France, which protected the property rights of French
subjects residing in the United States.245 Neither Article 11 nor any
other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the defendants
to enforce the treaty in a domestic court. Regardless, Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the Court, applied the treaty on behalf of the defen-
dants. The Court held that the "alienage of Lacassaign constitutes no
objection ... [because] the treaty of 1778, between the United States
and France, secures to the citizens and subjects of either power the
privilege of holding lands in the territory of the other .... ,,246
In Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Ha-
ven,247 a British corporation brought an action for ejectment against
the Town of New Haven. The plaintiff owned the subject property
before the Revolutionary War.248 After the war, the Vermont legisla-
ture passed a law that expropriated the plaintiff and granted its prop-
erty rights in the state "to the respective towns in which such lands
lay .... ",249 In support of its suit for ejectment, plaintiff invoked Ar-
ticle 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, which prohibited confisca-
tion of British property in the United States. 250 Neither Article 6 nor
242. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 275.
243. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
244. Id. at 182-86.
245. 1778 Treaty with France, supra note 185, art. 11 ("The Subjects and Inhabitants of
the said United States ... may by Testament, Donation, or otherwise dispose of their Goods
moveable and immoveable in favour of such Persons as to them shall seem good; and their
Heirs, Subjects of the Said United States, residing whether in France or elsewhere, may
succeed them ab intestat, without being obliged to obtain Letters of Naturalization, and
without having the Effect of this Concession contested or impeded under Pretext of any
Rights or Prerogatives of Provinces, Cities, or Private Persons .... The Subjects of the most
Christian King shall enjoy on their Part, in all the Dominions of the said States, an entire and
perfect Reciprocity relative to the Stipulations contained in the present Article.").
246. Carneal, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 189.
247. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823).
248. Id. at 465-66.
249. Id. at 466.
250. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 6 ("[T]here shall be no future
Confiscations made nor any Prosecutions commenc'd against any Person or Persons for or
by Reason of the Part, which he or they may have taken in the present War, and that no
Person shall on that Account suffer any future Loss or Damage, either in his Person Liberty
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any other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiff
to enforce the treaty in a domestic court.251 Nevertheless, the Court
enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiff. Referring to the land
grant from the Vermont legislature to the Town of New Haven, the
Court said: "[T]he only question is, whether this grant was not void
by force of the 6th article of the above treaty? We think it was. '252
In Carver v. Jackson, 53 plaintiffs who traced their property
claims to Roger Morris brought an action for ejectment. The New
York legislature had confiscated Morris's property during the Revo-
lutionary War.2 54 After conclusion of the peace treaty with Britain,
New York passed laws requiring plaintiffs who sued to regain pos-
session of confiscated properties to pay the occupants of those prop-
erties for any improvements made thereon.255 When plaintiffs sued
for ejectment, defendant sought compensation for improvements in
accordance with New York law.256 In reply, plaintiffs contended that
state laws requiring them to pay compensation for improvements vio-
lated the Definitive Treaty of Peace. 257 Neither Article 6 nor any
other provision of the treaty specifically empowered the plaintiffs to
enforce the treaty in a domestic court. 258 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court enforced the treaty on behalf of the plaintiffs, holding "that the
claim for improvements in this case, is inconsistent with the treaty of
peace, and ought to be rejected. '259
or Property ....").
251. Article 5 of the treaty created a private right of action for British subjects whose
land was confiscated before entry into force of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. See supra
notes 168-69 and accompanying text. Article 5 did not apply in this case, though, because
the treaty took effect in 1783, and the confiscation in this case did not occur until 1794.
Thus, this case was governed by Article 6, which addressed future confiscations. Article 6
did not create a private right of action.
252. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 490-91 (1823).
253. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1 (1830).
254. Id. at 4.
255. Id. at 99- 100.
256. Id. at 4-5.
257. Id. at 65-66.
258. The Court's opinion cites both Articles 5 and 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.
See id. at 100-01. Article 5 was retrospective, addressing confiscation of British property
before entry into force of the treaty; Article 6 was prospective, addressing future
confiscations. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168. The point at issue in Carver
was whether New York could enforce laws enacted in 1784 and 1786 (after entry into force
of the peace treaty) that would have required plaintiffs to pay for improvements made by
defendants. See Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 99-100. The Court held that state laws requiring
plaintiffs to pay for improvements constituted a "confiscation" of their estate, in violation of
Article 6. Id. at 100-01. Thus, although Article 5 created a private right of action for claims
involving confiscation of property before entry into force of the peace treaty, see supra notes
168-69 and accompanying text, that right of action did not apply to the specific claim at
issue in Carver.
259. Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 101.
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In Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co.,260 a British prize
court had condemned a U.S. ship. The ship owner sued the insurance
company for breach of contract because the insurer refused to issue
payment on the policy.261 The company claimed that the judgment of
the British court terminated its contractual obligation under the pol-
icy.262 The Supreme Court, though, ruled in favor of the ship owner
on the grounds that the capture and condemnation of the ship violated
Article 18 of the Jay Treaty.263 Article 18 created a duty for British
naval vessels not to detain American ships. 264 The treaty, however,
did not explicitly empower ship owners to bring suit in U.S. courts
for violations of Article 18. Nor was there any federal statute that au-
thorized private enforcement of the treaty. Nevertheless, the Court
awarded a remedy to the individual plaintiff whose treaty rights were
violated. 265
In all five cases, the Court applied the transnationalist pre-
sumption in favor of judicial remedies for violations of individual
treaty rights. In every case, the Court enforced the treaty on behalf of
the party invoking the treaty, even though there was no statutory or
treaty provision that expressly empowered individual litigants to en-
force the treaty. All five cases, therefore, are inconsistent with the
nationalist model. From the standpoint of Justice Marshall and his
contemporaries, though, the absence of an express private right of ac-
tion was not a bar to judicial enforcement because, in their view,
every treaty provision that protects individual rights empowers the
right-holder to invoke the treaty before a U.S. court.
4. Cases in Which It Is Unclear Whether the Treaty Created a
Private Right of Action
The previous section analyzed cases where the Court enforced
a treaty on behalf of an individual litigant, despite the fact that there
was no statutory or treaty provision granting that individual a private
cause of action. That section was purposefully repetitive to make the
point that the Supreme Court repeatedly, in case after case, applied a
260. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185 (1808).
261. Id. at 197.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 199-202.
264. See Jay Treaty, supra note 232, art. 18 ("And Whereas it frequently happens that
vessels sail for a Port or Place belonging to an Enemy, without knowing that the same is...
blockaded ... [i]t is agreed, that every Vessel so circumstanced may be turned away from
such Port or Place, but she shall not be detained . . . unless after notice she shall again
attempt to enter ... ").
265. Fitzsimmons, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 197-202.
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treaty to resolve a dispute where neither a treaty nor a statute created
a private right of action. Those cases are patently inconsistent with
the nationalist model.
This section analyzes cases where the Court enforced a treaty
on behalf of an individual litigant, there was no statutory right of ac-
tion, and it is debatable whether the treaty at issue created a private
right of action. If one construes the nationalist requirement for a
right of action strictly, insisting on express treaty language that em-
powers individual litigants to enforce the treaty, then these cases are
also inconsistent with the nationalist model. If one construes the
right of action requirement less rigidly, permitting implied rights of
action in some cases, then these cases are arguably consistent with
the nationalist model.
Before analyzing these cases, two points merit attention.
First, in none of the cases under consideration here did the Court spe-
cifically address, separate from the merits of the case, the question
whether the treaty created a private right of action. In the jurispru-
dence of the early nineteenth century, the Court simply assumed that
every individual litigant whose treaty-based rights were violated had
the power to enforce those rights in a domestic court. Second, while
it is possible to analyze these cases in a manner that is consistent with
the nationalist model by construing the right of action requirement
liberally, that analysis is in tension with many of the modem cases
applying the nationalist model, where courts have construed the right
of action requirement quite strictly.
During the period under study, the Supreme Court decided six
cases in which it awarded judgment to individual litigants whose
rights were protected under Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, including two
cases where plaintiffs prevailed in their treaty-based claims,266 and
four cases where defendants won treaty-based defenses. 267 In none
266. Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (ordering foreclosure and sale
of mortgaged property to secure individual property right protected by Article 9 of Jay
Treaty); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 594 (1818) (ordering defendants to convey
land to plaintiff because defendants had wrongfully appropriated land in violation of Article
9 of Jay Treaty).
267. Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830) (where plaintiffs brought equitable
action, asserting entitlement to defendants' share of proceeds from sale of land, Court held
that Article 9 of Jay Treaty protected defendants' right to half of proceeds from sale); Orr v.
Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453 (1819) (where plaintiff sued to rescind contract for
purchase of land, challenging validity of defendant's title, Court dismissed bill for rescission
because defendant had valid title protected by Article 6 of Definitive Treaty of Peace and
Article 9 of Jay Treaty); Jackson v. Clarke, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 1 (1818) (where plaintiff
sued for ejectment, Court dismissed suit because Article 9 of Jay Treaty protected rights of
British citizens to hold and inherit land); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 603 (1812) (where plaintiff sued for ejectment, Court dismissed suit because
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of these cases was there a federal statute empowering individual liti-
gants to enforce Article 9 in a U.S. court. Thus, every case would
have been decided differently under the nationalist model, unless the
treaty itself creates a private right of action. Whether it does is a
close question.
Article 9 states as follows:
It is agreed, that British Subjects who now hold Lands
in the Territories of the United States, and American
Citizens who now hold Lands in the Dominions of His
Majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the
nature and Tenure of their respective Estates and Ti-
tles therein, and may grant Sell or Devise the same to
whom they please, in like manner as if they were Na-
tives; and that neither they nor their Heirs or assigns
shall, so far as may respect the said Lands, and the le-
gal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as
Aliens. 268
If the treaty drafters had not included the italicized phrase,
Article 9 would clearly not satisfy the nationalist requirement for a
private cause of action. Advocates of the nationalist model could
reasonably argue, though, that the decisions enforcing Article 9 on
behalf of individual litigants are consistent with the nationalist model
because the italicized phrase empowers individual litigants to enforce
Article 9 in a domestic court. In support of this argument, they could
cite the Supreme Court's statement that "the remedies, as well as the
rights, of these aliens, are completely protected by the treaty of 1794
"269
On the other hand, the phrasing of Article 9 suggests that the
treaty-drafters, like the courts of that era, were working against the
background assumption that "where there is a right, there is a rem-
edy." That widely shared background assumption may explain why
the treaty drafters described the legal remedies as being "incident to"
estates and titles in land. Under this transnationalist view, the treaty
itself protects titles in land (a primary right), and the associated legal
remedies are "incident to" those titles.
Assume, hypothetically, that the New York legislature passed
defendant's title to land was secured by Article 9 of Jay Treaty). For additional analysis of
Fairfax's Devisee, see GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 554-57 (1981) (History of the Supreme Court of the
United States Vol. 2).
268. Jay Treaty, supra note 232, art. 9 (emphasis added).
269. Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489, 496 (1824).
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a law abolishing the traditional action for ejectment, and requiring
individuals to petition the Governor, instead of filing suit in court,
whenever they wanted to assert claims to land occupied by someone
else. If the law applied equally to citizens and aliens, there would be
no violation of the Jay Treaty.270 Therefore, Article 9 of the Jay
Treaty does not actually empower British citizens to enforce the
treaty in U.S. courts-that is, it does not create a private right of ac-
tion. It merely prevents discrimination against British citizens who
hold title to property in the United States, ensuring that they have
equal access to the remedies that U.S. law provides for U.S. citizens.
If this view is correct, then the six cases in which the Supreme Court
awarded individual remedies for violations of Article 9 are inconsis-
tent with the nationalist model.
B. Cases Where the Court Did Not Reach the Merits of a Treaty-
Based Claim or Defense
In United States v. Judge Lawrence,271 the Attorney General
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, invoking Arti-
cle 9 of a consular treaty with France, 272 and seeking to compel the
270. The Court's decision in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet,
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480 (1830), supports this point. The plaintiff was a British corporation that
owned land in Vermont before the Revolutionary War. See id. at 500-02. In 1794, many
years after the war ended, the Vermont legislature confiscated plaintiff's property in
Vermont. By operation of state law, the land at issue passed to the Town of Pawlet, which
then rented the subject property to Ozias Clarke, who retained possession and occupancy
until plaintiff sued for ejectment. Id. at 481-84. The Vermont law confiscating plaintiffs
property was a clear violation of Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, and of Article 9
of the Jay Treaty. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 6 (prohibiting future
confiscation of British property); Jay Treaty, supra note 232, art. 9 (protecting the rights of
British nationals who held land in the United States). Plaintiff sought two distinct remedies
for the violation of its treaty rights: recovery of the land and collection of mesne profits.
The traditional common law action for ejectment carried with it a remedial right to recover
mesne profits. See Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 489, 508. Vermont, though, had
enacted statutes that superseded the common law and barred recovery of mesne profits by
plaintiffs in ejectment actions. Id. at 508-09. Defendants, therefore, contested plaintiff's
claim for mesne profits. The Court ruled in favor of the defendants on this point. Justice
Story, writing for the Court, said that Vermont had "prescribed the restrictions upon which
mesne profits shall be recovered; and these restrictions are obligatory upon the citizens of
the state. The plaintiffs have not, in this particular, any privileges by treaty beyond those of
citizens." Id. at 509-10. Since the law restricting mesne profits applied equally to citizens
and aliens, Vermont could apply the law to British plaintiffs without violating their treaty
rights.
271. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)42 (1795).
272. Convention Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of Consuls and
Vice Consuls, U.S.-Fr., art. 9, Nov. 14, 1788, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 228, 237-38 (Hunter Miller ed.,
Gov't Printing Office 1931) [hereinafter Consular Convention].
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district judge to issue a warrant for extradition of an alleged de-
serter. 273 The Attorney General asserted that the district judge had
violated the treaty by refusing to issue a warrant. 274 The Supreme
Court declined to rule on the merits of the government's treaty claim,
holding unanimously "that a mandamus ought not to issue" because
the judge had acted within the scope of his discretion. 275 Judge Law-
rence is consistent with the nationalist model because the party in-
voking the treaty did not obtain the remedy sought.276 The case is
also consistent with the transnationalist model, though, because the
district court held that the United States did not have a duty to extra-
dite the fugitive (hence, France had no right to compel his extradi-
tion), and the Supreme Court did not disturb that ruling.
The Supreme Court decided three treaty cases between 1789
and 1838 that it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.277 In three other
cases, the Court concluded that it lacked sufficient information to de-
cide the merits of the treaty claim.278 None of these six cases support
273. Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 42-44. Initially, the French Vice Consul filed
suit in the district court, seeking a warrant for extradition of Captain Barre. Id. at 42-43.
The district judge refused to issue the warrant on the ground that the Vice Consul failed to
provide the proof required by the treaty. See id. at 43-44. The case counts as a case in
which an individual litigant raised a treaty-based claim because the Vice Consul asserted, on
behalf of France, a right to have the deserter extradited.
274. See id. at 48-53. Interestingly, in support of the government's argument for a writ
of mandamus, the Attorney General stated: "The general principle of issuing that writ, is
founded on the necessity of affording a competent remedy for every right .... " Id. at 52.
Thus, in the late 18th century, even the Attorney General apparently endorsed the
transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies for treaty violations.
275. Id. at 53.
276. At the district court level, the French Vice Consul failed to obtain a warrant for
extradition, which was the remedy he sought. Id. at 52. At the Supreme Court level, the
Attorney General failed to obtain a writ of mandamus, which was the remedy he sought. Id.
at 53.
277. Keene v. Clark's Heirs, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 291 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed that
he was evicted from land, and that his title was protected by treaty, Court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction because state court had decided case on the basis of state law); New Orleans
v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 236 (1835) (where individual plaintiffs sued City of New
Orleans, asserting title to property in the city, and City raised defense based on Louisiana
Treaty, Court held that "[t]he case involves no principle on which this court could take
jurisdiction"); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809) (where defendant
raised defense based on Article 5 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, Court dismissed case for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that case did not "arise under" a treaty).
278. Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 513 (1830) (where plaintiffs asserted
rights to land in Missouri, claiming title based on Spanish grants protected by the Louisiana
Treaty, Court determined that it was "unable to form a judgment which would be
satisfactory" and decided "to hold the cases ... under advisement"); The Divina Pastora, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819) (where Spanish consul sought restoration of captured vessel to
Spanish ship owners, alleging that capture violated the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court
remanded case to circuit court for further proceedings); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
300 (1816) (where British plaintiff raised claim based on Article 9 of Jay Treaty, Court
remanded case to circuit court for additional fact-finding).
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the transnationalist model because, in each case, the Court declined
to enforce the treaty on behalf of an individual litigant. However,
none of these cases endorse the nationalist presumption against pri-
vate enforcement of treaties. In each case, the Court's rationale for
refusing to reach the merits is a rationale that applies equally to con-
stitutional, statutory, and common law claims. In no case did the
Court decline to reach the merits because the treaty was not "judi-
cially enforceable," or because the treaty did not create a private right
of action. Thus, all six cases are consistent with both the nationalist
and transnationalist models.
In addition to the seven cases cited above, the Supreme Court
decided two other cases during this period in which it declined to
reach the merits of a treaty-based claim or defense: Strother v. Lu-
cas279 and De la Croix v. Chamberlain.280 Both Strother and De la
Croix were ejectment actions. In both cases, the plaintiff claimed ti-
tle to land as the successor to a person who acquired an interest in the
subject property when the territory was under Spanish control.281 In
both cases, the plaintiffs property rights were protected by treaty:
Article 3 of the Louisiana Treaty in Strother282 and Article 8 of the
Florida Treaty in De la Croix.283 Congress had enacted a series of
statutes creating boards of commissioners with authority to entertain
claims by individuals who asserted property rights protected by the
Louisiana or Florida treaties. The statutes directed individuals to
present their claims to the relevant board, and granted the boards au-
thority to confirm titles to land in territory subject to their respective
jurisdictions. 284 In De la Croix, the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-
interest failed to present a claim to the relevant board of commission-
ers;285 in Strother, the plaintiffs predecessor failed to do so in a
timely fashion. 286  In each case, the plaintiffs failure to abide by
279. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838).
280. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599 (1827).
281. See Strother, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 430-32; De la Croix, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 599-
600.
282. See Strother, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 435-40. See also Louisiana Treaty, supra note
155, art. 3.
283. See De la Croix, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 601-02. See also Florida Treaty, supra
note 161, art. 8.
284. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
285. See De la Croix, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 601-02 ("It does not appear that this order
of survey has ever been recorded or passed upon by the board of commissioners, or register
of the land office, established by Congress in the district in which the land lies.").
286. See Strother, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 453-54. In Strother, the plaintiff's predecessor
did file a claim with the recorder of land titles in 1815. See id. However, defendant's
predecessor had filed a claim with the board of commissioners in 1806, which the board had
confirmed in 1809-10. Id. at 433. Plaintiffs predecessor, therefore, filed her claim several
years too late.
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statutorily prescribed procedures was a key element of the Court's ra-
tionale for awarding judgment to the defendant. 287
Therefore, Strother and De la Croix signify that in cases
where Congress has established a domestic remedial mechanism ena-
bling individuals to enforce their treaty-based rights, individuals who
fail to utilize the congressionally established mechanism may ulti-
mately lose the ability to enforce their rights. Both cases are consis-
tent with the transnationalist model because that model recognizes
that Congress has the power to enact legislation that restricts the
availability of domestic judicial remedies for individuals who have
treaty-protected rights. Both cases are also consistent with the na-
tionalist model, inasmuch as the Court denied remedies in both cases
for plaintiffs whose rights were protected by treaties. Neither case,
however, endorses the nationalist presumption against private en-
forcement of treaties. In neither case did the Court deny relief on the
grounds that the treaty at issue did not create a private right of action
or that the treaty was not judicially enforceable.
C. Cases Where the Party Invoking the Treaty Lost on the Merits
Between 1789 and 1838, the Supreme Court decided twelve
cases in which it ruled that a treaty did not protect the right asserted
by the individual invoking the treaty.288 All twelve cases are consis-
287. See id. at 453-54; De la Croix, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 601-02.
288. See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838) (where plaintiff sued to eject
defendant from land in Louisiana, asserting rights under 1819 treaty whereby the United
States acquired Florida from Spain, plaintiff had no treaty rights because the United States
had acquired subject land from France as part of Louisiana purchase in 1803); United States
v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 476 (1838) (where plaintiff asserted title to land in Florida
protected by Article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, plaintiff never acquired title from Spain
because he failed to perform condition precedent that was required in order to obtain title by
virtue of Spanish grant); United States v. Mills' Heirs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 215 (1838) (where
plaintiff asserted title to land in Florida protected by Article 8 of 1819 Florida Treaty, Court
rejected claim because he failed to perform condition required by express terms of Spanish
grant); Smith v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 326 (1836) (where plaintiff claimed title to
land in Missouri protected by Article 3 of Treaty for Cession of Louisiana, Court rejected
claim because Spanish "grant" merely gave him option to select land, and option expired
because he failed to exercise option before March 1804); Soc'y for Propagation of the
Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480 (1830) (where British corporation asserted
right to recover mesne profits for confiscated land, Court held that neither the Jay Treaty nor
the Definitive Treaty of Peace granted plaintiff right to recover mesne profits); Comegys v.
Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828) (where claims commission established by treaty awarded
payment to assignees from U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, bankrupt person sued assignees to
recover funds, and assignees invoked judgment of treaty-based claims Commission as a
defense, Court held that Commission's judgment did not bar suit because Commission's
authority under treaty extended only to claims by U.S. citizens against Spain, but not to
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tent with the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial reme-
dies. That presumption applies only in cases where an individual es-
tablishes that his or her treaty rights have been violated. In each of
these twelve cases, the presumption did not apply because the Court
decided that the treaty did not protect the right asserted by the indi-
vidual invoking the treaty.
It bears emphasis that none of the twelve cases cited above
endorses the nationalist presumption against private enforcement of
treaties. None of the cases denied relief on the ground that the treaty
at issue did not create a private right of action. 289 Moreover, none of
the cases denied relief on the ground that the treaty at issue was not
judicially enforceable. Indeed, all twelve cases involved treaties that
the Court enforced on behalf of individual litigants in other cases.290
disputes between U.S. citizens); Blight's Lessee v. Rochester, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 535 (1822)
(where plaintiffs asserted title to land in Kentucky by descent from James Dunlap, a British
subject, Court held that Dunlap's title was not protected by either the Jay Treaty or the
Definitive Treaty of Peace, because he acquired title after the peace treaty took effect and
died before signature of the Jay Treaty); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 76
(1821) (in a dispute between a U.S. captor and a Spanish claimant who invoked Article XVII
of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, the Court ruled in favor of the U.S. captor, holding that "the
immunity ... intended by that article [XVII] never took effect"); The Nuestra Senora de la
Caridad, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 497 (1819) (ruling in favor of captor and rejecting claim of
Spanish ship owner, who invoked the 1795 Treaty with Spain, because the treaty did not
protect the subject goods from capture); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) (where
American privateer captured enemy vessel with neutral cargo, and asserted a right to seize
the cargo under Article 15 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain, Court held that the law of nations
protects neutral cargo from capture, and the treaty did not alter the law of nations in that
respect); Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810) (where defendant held land in
trust for British subject that Maryland confiscated in 1780, Court held that confiscation did
not violate Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace because Maryland confiscated the land
before the treaty took effect); Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794)
(where French privateer contended that Article 17 of 1778 Treaty with France barred the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction in a prize case, Court ruled that the treaty did not
deprive the district court of jurisdiction, and instructed the court to decide whether
"restitution can be made consistently with the laws of nations and the treaties and laws of the
United States").
289. In two of the cases, the party invoking the treaty had an express private right of
action under Article 20 of the 1795 Treaty with Spain. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 1 (1821); The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 497 (1819). See
also supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing other cases involving Article 20
of the 1795 Treaty with Spain). In three of the cases, the party invoking the treaty had an
express private right of action under federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida or
Missouri. See United States v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 476 (1838) (land in Florida);
United States v. Mills' Heirs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 215 (1838) (land in Florida); Smith v. United
States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 326 (1836) (land in Missouri). See also supra notes 159-65 and
accompanying text (discussing federal statutes pertaining to land in Florida and Missouri).
290. Smith v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 326 (1836), involved Article 3 of the
Louisiana Treaty, which the Court enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in three other
cases. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (discussing those three cases).
Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838), United States v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 476
(1838), and United States v. Mills'Heirs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 215 (1838) all involved Article 8
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Therefore, these twelve cases provide no support for the nationalist
model. In fact, these cases tend to support the transnationalist model,
because the Court generally applied a transnationalist "rights-focused
methodology," not a nationalist "remedies-focused" methodology.
In addition to the twelve cases cited above, the Supreme
Court decided one other case during this period in which the party
invoking a treaty lost on the merits of a treaty-based claim or de-
fense: Foster v. Neilson.291 Foster illustrates an important limitation
on the transnationalist principle that "where there is a right, there is a
remedy. '292 Section D below addresses Foster.
D. Foster and Its Progeny
Virtually every modem case that endorses the nationalist pre-
sumption against individual enforcement of treaty rights cites Foster
v. Neilson293 as authority for that presumption, 294 or cites some other
of the Florida Treaty, which the Court enforced on behalf of individual plaintiffs in nine
other cases. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (discussing those nine cases).
Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828), involved Articles 9 and 11 of the Florida
Treaty. The Court did not decide any other cases during this period implicating those
specific treaty provisions.
Soc 'y for Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480
(1830), Blight's Lessee v. Rochester, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 535 (1822), and Smith v. Maryland,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810) all involved Article 9 of the Jay Treaty, or Article 6 of the
Definitive Treaty of Peace, or both. The Court enforced Article 9 of the Jay Treaty on
behalf of individual litigants in six other cases during this period. See supra notes 266-72
and accompanying text. The Court enforced Article 6 of the Definitive Treaty of Peace on
behalf of individual litigants in two other cases. See supra notes 247-59 and accompanying
text.
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821), The Nuestra Senora de la
Caridad, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 497 (1819), and The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) all
involved the 1795 Treaty with Spain. The Court enforced that treaty on behalf of individual
litigants in two other cases: The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152 (1821) and The
Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227 (1817). Both The Nereide (where the party invoking the
treaty lost) and The Pizarro (where the party invoking the treaty won) involved Article 15 of
that treaty. The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad does not say which specific Article is
implicated. The Amiable Isabella involved Article 17 of the treaty. The Court did not
decide any other cases during this period implicating that specific treaty provision.
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6 (1794) involved Article 17 of the
1778 Treaty with France. The Court enforced Article 17 on behalf of individual litigants in
United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 121 (1795) and Geyer v. Michel, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 285
(1796). See supra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
291. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
292. Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410 (1838) and De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599 (1827) also illustrate important limitations on the ubijus principle.
See supra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
293. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
294. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing
Foster as authority for the proposition that "[t]reaties do not generally create rights privately
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case that cites Foster as authority. In particular, the modem cases
cite the portion of the Foster opinion that has come to be associated
with the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties. 295 But insofar as the
nationalist model relies on Foster's non-self-execution rationale,296 it
is a model erected on a foundation of sand. This is true for three rea-
sons. First, the non-self-execution portion of Foster is properly
viewed as a concurring opinion because the majority in Foster would
have decided the case on other grounds.297 Second, the Court over-
ruled the non-self-execution portion of Foster four years after it de-
cided the case.298 Third, Foster says nothing about private rights of
action, and it did not endorse a presumption against judicial enforce-
ment of treaties.
This section demonstrates that Foster provides no support for
the nationalist model. The analysis is divided into five sub-sections.
The first sub-section provides historical background. Next, the arti-
cle discusses the "political question" holding in Foster. Then, the ar-
ticle addresses the territorial application of Article 8 of the Florida
Treaty. The last two sub-sections examine the "non-self-execution"
rationale in Foster, and address the relationship between Foster and
the nationalist model.
1. Historical Background
The land at issue in Foster is situated within an area that is
enforceable in the courts"); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing
Foster as authority for the proposition that "treaties do not generally create rights that are
privately enforceable in the federal courts").
295. The so-called doctrine of non-self-executing treaties is actually four distinct
doctrines. See Sloss, supra note 18, at 12-18 (summarizing four doctrines). See also
Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 18 (presenting a different four-fold classification).
The two versions of the doctrine that emerged in the twentieth century are radically
different, in important respects, from the two nineteenth century versions of the doctrine.
See Sloss, supra note 18, at 12-18. Thus, the "non-self-execution" portion of Foster bears
very little relationship to the modem doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.
296. Foster never used the terms "self-executing" or "non-self-executing". Justice
Marshall's contemporaries used the terms "executory" and "executed" to describe what is
now commonly referred to as Foster's non-self-execution holding. See, e.g., Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 746-47 (1838). It was not until 1887, in the case of
Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887), that the Court first used the terms "self-
executing" and "non-self-executing" to describe Foster's distinction between executory and
executed treaty provisions. Nevertheless, in accordance with modem terminology, this
article will use the term "non-self-execution" to refer to the relevant portion of Marshall's
opinion in Foster.
297. See infra notes 313-31 and accompanying text.
298. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833) (expressly
overruling the non-self-execution portion of Foster). See also United States v. Arredondo,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832) (overruling Foster sub silentio).
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bounded on the North by the thirty-first parallel, on the West by the
Mississippi River, and on the East by the Perdido River.299 In terms
of contemporary geography, this area includes the southernmost por-
tions of Alabama and Mississippi, and parts of southeastern Louisi-
ana (not including New Orleans). This article will refer to the area as
"Floriana." In the early nineteenth century, there was a dispute be-
tween the United States and Spain as to whether Floriana was part of
Florida, which Spain owned at that time, or Louisiana, which the
United States owned.
As of 1760, Louisiana was French territory and Florida was
Spanish territory. The Perdido River was the accepted boundary be-
tween Louisiana and Florida.300 Floriana, therefore, was part of Lou-
isiana. In 1763, Great Britain, France, and Spain signed the Treaty of
Paris. By that treaty, Great Britain acquired Florida from Spain.
Great Britain also acquired from France that portion of Louisiana that
lay east of the Mississippi River, except for New Orleans and the is-
land on which it is situated.301 In a separate, secret treaty concluded
at about the same time, France ceded the residue of Louisiana to
Spain.30 2 The King of England then divided his newly acquired terri-
tory into two provinces, which were labeled East and West Florida.
By a royal proclamation issued in 1763, he established the 31 st paral-
lel as the northern border of the two Floridas. 30 3 At that time, Flori-
ana became part of West Florida.
The United States declared its independence from Britain in
1776. During the Revolutionary War, Spain conquered Florida, re-
claiming the land from Britain. 30 4 In September 1783, Great Britain
signed peace treaties with both the United States and Spain. In the
treaty with Spain, Britain ceded East and West Florida, including
Floriana, to Spain, 30 5 but that treaty did not specify the boundaries of
Florida. The treaty between Britain and the United States established
the Mississippi River as the western boundary of the United States,
and the thirty-first parallel as the southern boundary separating the
299. The Perdido River currently forms the western boundary of Florida that separates
the Florida panhandle from Alabama.
300. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 300 (1829).
301. Id. at 300-01.
302. Id.
303. Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 524 (1827). The thirty-first parallel
now forms the border between the Florida panhandle and that portion of Southern Alabama
that lies east of the Perdido River. The thirty-first parallel also forms part of the border
between Mississippi and Louisiana.
304. Henderson v. Poindexter's Lessee, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 530, 534 (1827).
305. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 301.
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United States from Florida.30 6 Neither treaty established a boundary
between Louisiana and Florida, but the issue was unimportant at that
time because Spain owned both territories, having acquired Louisiana
from France in 1763 and Florida from Britain in 1783.
In 1800, France and Spain concluded the Treaty of Saint Ilde-
fonso, in which Spain agreed "to retrocede to the French republic ...
the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now
has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it..
"307 This language was deeply ambiguous. The province of Lou-
isiana "when France possessed it," prior to 1763, included Floriana-
i.e., the land east of the Mississippi, west of the Perdido, and south of
the thirty-first parallel. But Britain had incorporated Floriana into
Florida in 1763, and Spain had acquired Floriana (along with the rest
of Florida) from Britain in 1783. Thus, Spain insisted that when it
ceded Louisiana to France "with the same extent that it now has in
the hands of Spain," Floriana was not included as part of Louisi-
ana. 30
8
In the Louisiana Purchase agreement concluded in 1803, the
United States acquired Louisiana from France. That treaty, however,
merely referred back to the Treaty of Saint Ildefonso to define the
boundaries of Louisiana.30 9 Beginning in 1803, Congress passed a
series of acts to establish U.S. control over Louisiana.310 Congres-
sional actions left no doubt that Congress believed the United States
had acquired Floriana from France as part of the Louisiana Pur-
chase. 311 Congress, therefore, asserted U.S. sovereignty over Flori-
ana. Meanwhile, Spain continued to assert Spanish sovereignty over
Floriana, claiming the territory as part of Florida. The United States
and Spain did not finally resolve this political dispute until Spain
ceded Florida to the United States in the Florida Treaty of 1819.312
In the interim, however, between 1803 and 1819, Spain had granted
land in Floriana to various Spanish grantees.
2. The "Political Question" Holding in Foster
Foster involved a dispute over title to land east of the Missis-
sippi River, and south of the thirty-first parallel, in what is now
306. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 168, art. 2.
307. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 301 (quoting Treaty of St. Ildefonso).
308. See id. at 302-03.
309. See Louisiana Treaty, supra note 155, art. 1.
310. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 303-09.
311. Id.
312. See Florida Treaty, supra note 161, arts. 2 and 3.
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southeastern Louisiana. The plaintiffs traced their title to an 1804
land grant from the Spanish governor of Florida.313 In response to
their petition, defendant alleged that, prior to the 1804 grant, the land
had been "ceded by Spain to France, and by France to the United
States; and the officer making said grant had not then and there any
right [to grant the land], and the said grant is wholly null and
void. '314 Thus, the first question presented in Foster was whether the
1804 Spanish land grant was valid. The resolution of that question,
in turn, hinged on the issue whether the United States had acquired
the land from France in 1803 as part of the Louisiana purchase, the
very issue that had been the subject of a political dispute between the
United States and Spain from 1803 to 1819.
The Court noted that the language of the relevant treaties-
the Louisiana Treaty and the Treaty of St. Ildefonso--could plausibly
be interpreted to support either the Spanish position (that the land at
issue was part of Spanish Florida in 1804) or the U.S. position (that it
was part of the United States in 1804).315 In this context, Marshall
stated:
In a controversy between two nations concerning na-
tional boundary, it is scarcely possible that the courts
of either should refuse to abide by the measures
adopted by its own government. There being no
common tribunal to decide between them, each deter-
mines for itself on its own rights, and if they cannot
adjust their differences peaceably, the right remains
with the strongest. The judiciary is not that depart-
ment of the government, to which the assertion of its
interests against foreign powers is confided .... [I]t
is the province of the Court to conform its decisions to
the will of the legislature, if that will has been clearly
expressed. 316
In short, the Court's initial holding in Foster was "that the
question of boundary between the United States and Spain, was a
question for the political departments of the government .... ,,317
313. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 253-55.
314. Id. at 255.
315. Id. at306-07.
316. Id. at 307.
317. Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 516 (1838) (restating the holding of Foster).
See also Delacroix v. Chamberlain, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599, 600 (1827) (foreshadowing
Foster's political question holding in the following terms: "A question of disputed boundary
between two sovereign independent nations is, indeed, much more properly a subject for
diplomatic discussion ... than ofjudicial investigation.").
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Since Congress had enacted numerous statutes asserting U.S. sover-
eignty over Floriana, 318 the Court accepted the U.S. view that the
United States had acquired the subject property when it purchased
Louisiana in 1803.319 This meant that the plaintiffs could not estab-
lish a valid title on the basis of the 1804 Spanish grant because the
Spanish governor had no authority to grant land in U.S. territory.
The Court did not decide another case involving land in Flori-
ana until it decided Garcia v. Lee in 1838,320 nine years after its deci-
sion in Foster.321 By that time, Roger Taney was Chief Justice, Mar-
shall having died in the interim. In Garcia, Taney reaffirmed
Foster's political question holding, stating "that the boundary line de-
termined on as the true one by the political departments of the gov-
ernment, must be recognised as the true one by the judicial depart-
ment .... ,,322 Indeed, Taney characterized this holding as the
"leading principle" of the Court's decision in Foster. Clearly, Fos-
ter's "leading principle" has no application to recent disputes about
judicial enforcement of treaties because the principle, in Marshall's
own words, applies only to cases involving "a controversy between
two nations concerning national boundary. ' 323 In State v. Sanchez-
Llamas, though, the Oregon Supreme Court cited Foster's political
question holding in support of its view that the VCCR is not judi-
cially enforceable. 324 Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court conflated the
distinction between Foster's political question holding, which applies
only to disputes concerning national boundaries, and Foster's non-
self-execution rationale, which has potentially broader application.
3. The Territorial Application of Article 8
Having held that the plaintiffs could not establish a valid title
on the basis of the 1804 Spanish land grant, the Court in Foster next
considered whether the plaintiffs could establish a valid title on the
basis of Article 8 of the Florida Treaty.325 In Article 8, the United
States promised to honor "[a]ll the grants of land made before the
24th of January 1818, by [Spain] ... in the said Territories ceded by
318. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 303-09.
319. Id. at 307-09.
320. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
321. Keene v. Heirs of Clark, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 291 (1836), involved land in Floriana,
but the Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
322. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 520.
323. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 307.
324. See State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573, 576 (Or. 2005), affd on other
grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
325. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 310-14 (1829).
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his majesty to the United States. '326 This phraseology left open the
question whether Floriana was part of the territory "ceded by his
majesty to the United States," within the meaning of Article 8. The
Justices disagreed among themselves on that question. Marshall and
one other Justice thought that the United States had a duty under Ar-
ticle 8 to protect the interests of individuals, such as the Foster plain-
tiffs, who received Spanish land grants in Floriana before January
1818.327 Marshall conceded, though, that "[t]he majority of the Court
* . .think[s] differently. ' 328 The majority view was that the duty of
the United States under Article 8 to protect the property rights of
Spanish grantees applied only to grantees of land in Florida proper,
not to grantees of land in Floriana.329
If Marshall had concurred with the majority view that Article
8 did not apply to land in Floriana, it would never have been neces-
sary for the Foster court to decide whether Article 8 was self-
executing. The Court could have resolved the case on the grounds
that: (1) the plaintiffs' grant from Spain was void ab initio (the
Court's unanimous "political question" holding); and (2) plaintiffs
had no rights under the treaty because Article 8 did not apply to the
land at issue (the majority view on the territorial application ques-
tion). Indeed, the Court decided Garcia v. Lee, 330 the next case in-
volving land in Floriana, on precisely these grounds. Moreover,
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority in Garcia, stated that
the Court had decided Foster on these grounds! 331
Thus, from the perspective of Chief Justice Taney, writing
nine years after Foster, Marshall's discussion of non-self-execution
in Foster was pure dicta, unrelated to the central holdings of the case.
In a very important sense, Taney was right. If the Foster Court had
followed modem practice, wherein different justices write separate
opinions, a different judge would have written the majority opinion,
holding that Article 8 did not apply to land in Floriana, and Marshall
326. Florida Treaty, supra note 161, art. 8.
327. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 312-13 (stating that "[o]ne other judge and myself
are inclined to adopt" the view that Article 8 applied to the Spanish grants in Floriana).
328. Id. at 313.
329. See id. at 310-14.
330. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838).
331. See id. at 520-21 ("[T]he case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, decides this case. It
decides that the territory in which this land was situated, belonged to the United States at the
time that this grant was made by the Spanish authority; it decides that this grant is not
embraced by the eighth article of the treaty, which ceded the Floridas to the United States;
that the stipulations in that article are confined to the territory which belonged to Spain at
the time of the cession, according to the American construction of the treaty . )
(emphasis added).
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would have written a separate concurrence setting forth his view that
Article 8 was executory (not self-executing). But Marshall exercised
tight discipline over "his" court, so justices rarely wrote separate
opinions in the Marshall era.332 Thus, Marshall's opinion for the
Court presented the majority view,333 and then presented his alterna-
tive non-self-execution rationale that yielded the same result.334
Modem scholars have failed to recognize that the doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties has been constructed on the basis of a portion
of Marshall's opinion that was an alternative rationale supporting a
conclusion that the majority reached on other grounds. Worse yet, as
the next section shows, modem cases relying on Foster have misin-
terpreted Marshall's rationale, and have discounted the fact that the
Court itself rejected that rationale four years after it decided Foster.
4. The "Non-Self-Execution" Rationale in Foster
Since Marshall disagreed with the majority about the territo-
rial application of Article 8, he had two choices. He could dissent
from the majority view, or he could devise an alternative rationale
supporting the majority's conclusion that Article 8 did not grant
plaintiffs title to the disputed property. Marshall chose the latter
course.
Marshall's rationale relied on the distinction between "execu-
tory" and "executed" treaty provisions. In the terminology that was
widely used in the early nineteenth century, an executory contract
promised future performance, whereas an executed contract promised
immediate performance. 335 Marshall applied this distinction to Arti-
332. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35,
at 184 (1988) (volumes 3 and 4 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the
Supreme Court of the United States) ("Throughout most of Marshall's tenure, the Court had
a remarkable percentage of unanimous or near unanimous decisions .... For example,
between 1816 and 1823, a period in which the Court's composition was unchanged, the
Justices produced a total of 302 majority opinions. In all these cases, only twenty-four
dissents and eight concurrences were recorded ... .
333. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310-13.
334. The result was that plaintiffs lost because they failed to establish valid title, either
on the basis of the Spanish grant, or on the basis of Article 8. Marshall agreed with the
majority that Article 8 did not grant plaintiffs a complete title to the land at issue, but he
agreed for different reasons. The majority thought that the subject property was not within
the geographical scope of Article 8. Marshall thought that Article 8 was executory. See id.
at 3 13.
335. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *443 (explaining the difference
between executory and executed contracts). Justice Marshall had previously relied on the
distinction between executory and executed contracts in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 136-37 (1810). Justice Iredell applied this terminology to treaty provisions in Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 271-72 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting in part). Marshall did not
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cle 8 of the Florida Treaty, which said: "All the grants of land made
before the 24th of January 1818. [sic] by His Catholic Majesty or by
his lawful authorities .. .shall be ratified and confirmed to the per-
sons in possession of the lands .... "336 Marshall noted that the arti-
cle "does not say that those grants are hereby confirmed. Had such
been its language, it would have acted directly on the subject, and
would have repealed those acts of congress which were repugnant to
it. . . . 337 In short, if Article 8 said that the grants "are hereby con-
firmed," it would have been an executed treaty provision that granted
vested property rights to the Spanish grantees. Since the treaty used
the language "shall be ratified and confirmed," however, it was
merely executory-a promise of future action that required legisla-
tive implementation before the Spanish grantees could obtain vested
property rights. 338
The term "vested" rights is important here. In Marbury v.
Madison, Justice Marshall devoted a considerable portion of his opin-
ion to establishing the proposition that Mr. Marbury's appointment
was not revocable, and that the law creating the office granted him
"vested" legal rights.339 Marshall then famously declared: "The gov-
ernment of the United States has been emphatically termed a gov-
ernment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right. '340 Thus, in Marshall's view, the violation of
a vested legal right requires a remedy, but the violation of a non-
vested right does not necessarily require a remedy. Under Marshall's
non-self-execution rationale, Article 8 of the treaty granted the plain-
tiffs an inchoate title in the subject property, but it did not grant them
vested legal rights.341 Moreover, until Congress enacted legislation
use the terms "executed" and "executory" in Foster, but his contemporaries understood that
Marshall was drawing a distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions in
Foster. See Sloss, supra note 18, at 19-24.
336. Florida Treaty, supra note 161, art. 8 (emphasis added).
337. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314-15 (emphasis added).
338. Modem commentators have generally understood Foster's distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties to turn on the question whether the treaty has
domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing legislation. See, e.g., Louis HENKN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CoNsTIrurIoN 198-200 (2d ed. 1996); Paust,
supra note 18, at 767; Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 18, at 700-02. This
interpretation does not conform to the nineteenth century understanding of Foster, which
hinged on the distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions. See Sloss,
supra note 18, at 19-24.
339. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154-62.
340. Id. at 163.
341. Marshall did not use these terms in Foster, but this is the necessary implication of
what he did say. As noted above, Marshall believed that the land at issue was within the
territorial scope of Article 8. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313. This meant that the United
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to execute the treaty by granting them vested rights, the judiciary
could not provide a remedy. 342
Four years after Foster, in the case of United States v.
Percheman,343 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, re-
versed his opinion in Foster and concluded that Article 8 of the Flor-
ida Treaty was executed, not executory. 344 In contrast to Foster, the
land at issue in Percheman was clearly within the territorial scope of
Article 8 because it was located in East Florida in an area that was
subject to undisputed Spanish sovereignty before the 1819 treaty.
Moreover, since the plaintiffs claim was based on a Spanish grant
issued in December 1815, there was no question that Spain had the
authority to issue the grant. The grant conveyed to Percheman "two
thousand acres of land ... in absolute property. ' '345 Under principles
of international law that were generally accepted at that time, when
territory passed by treaty from one sovereign to another, "[t]he king
cedes that only which belonged to him. Lands he had previously
granted, were not his to cede. '346 Thus, even if the parties had not
included Article 8 in the treaty, Percheman's property rights "would
have been unaffected by the change" in sovereigns. 347 Therefore, it
was apparent to Marshall and the other justices that his previous in-
terpretation of Article 8, as applied to property in Florida (east of the
Perdido) was untenable, because it would have had the effect of di-
vesting landowners of their vested property rights. 348 Accordingly,
Marshall reinterpreted the phrase "shall be ratified and confirmed" in
the text of Article 8 to mean that the property rights of the grantees of
Spanish land grants were "'ratified and confirmed' by force of the in-
States had a duty under Article 8 to "ratifly] and confirm[]" the prior Spanish land grant. Id.
at 314-15. That duty necessarily gave the grantees certain correlative rights. Since the grant
itself was void, though, the plaintiffs had no rights by virtue of the grant. Moreover, in
accordance with nineteenth century conceptions of property rights, it would have been
unthinkable for a treaty-or any other legal document for that matter-to grant unnamed
individuals vested property rights in unspecified land. Therefore, Marshall must have
thought that the treaty granted the plaintiffs some type of inchoate property right that
required legislative action to be perfected into a complete title.
342. Id. at 314 ("But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract ...the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.").
343. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
344. See id. at 88-89.
345. Id. at 82-83.
346. Id. at 87.
347. Id.
348. Percheman had vested property rights before the treaty because the land was
granted to him in "absolute property." Under Marshall's interpretation of Article 8 in
Foster, though, the treaty would have converted Percheman's absolute title into an inchoate
property interest that could not be perfected without congressional action. This would have
been contrary to natural law principles that were widely accepted at the time, and might even
have been viewed as an unconstitutional taking.
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strument itself," that is, by the force of the treaty. 349 In short, the
treaty language was executed, the rights of Spanish grantees were
fully vested, and those rights were enforceable in the courts. 350
Marshall's non-self-execution rationale in Foster established
an exception to the general principle that there is a remedy for every
violation of a right: the principle applies only to vested rights. If a
treaty provision is executory, then individuals cannot obtain judicial
remedies for violations of that treaty provision until the provision is
executed and their rights have vested. The fact that Marshall himself
overruled Foster only four years after the case was decided suggests
that courts should be cautious in applying this exception to the pre-
sumption in favor of judicial remedies for violations of individual
treaty rights. If applied cautiously, the Foster exception is generally
consistent with the fundamental transnationalist presumption. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has been extremely cautious in applying the
Foster exception. In more than 175 years since Marshall's decision
in Foster, the Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties to deny a remedy to an individual whose treaty
rights were violated. 351 Unfortunately, in recent years, state courts
and lower federal courts have expanded the Foster exception to the
point where it threatens to swallow the underlying principle.
349. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89. Other commentators have noted that Marshall
relied on the Spanish text of the treaty to support his reinterpretation of Article 8. While that
explanation is true, it is incomplete. Marshall also relied heavily on the fact that his previous
interpretation of Article 8, if applied to land in Florida, would be contrary to principles of
natural law embodied in the law of nations. See id. at 86-87 ("The modem usage of nations,
which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property
should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled.").
350. Modem courts following the nationalist model frequently cite Foster, and then
include a parenthetical comment noting that Percheman overruled Foster "on other
grounds." See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring). This form of citation is very misleading. Percheman specifically
overruled Foster's rationale that Article 8 was executory.
351. Only once since Foster has the Supreme Court held that a treaty was not self-
executing, and that was an alternative holding. See Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of
Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1913). The main holding was that the Treaty of Brussels did
not apply to the patent at issue, and therefore did not grant plaintiff the patent rights it
asserted. See id. at 44-47. More recently, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not self-executing, but the plaintiff in
that case did not assert rights under the treaty. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739, 2763, 2767 (2004). For a brief survey of Supreme Court decisions involving self-
execution, see Sloss, supra note 18, at 71-73.
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5. Foster and the Nationalist Model
Contrary to claims advanced by advocates of the nationalist
model, Foster's non-self-execution rationale says nothing about pri-
vate rights of action, nor does it establish a presumption against judi-
cial enforcement of treaties. If modem courts wish to adhere faith-
fully to Marshall's non-self-execution rationale, then they must
examine the relevant treaty language to determine whether it prom-
ises immediate performance (executed) or future performance
(executory). Marshall's opinion in Foster does not support a pre-
sumption that treaties are generally executory.
Nationalists may cite the following passage from Foster in
defense of their view that Foster supports a presumption against self-
execution:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two na-
tions, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect,
of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so
far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried
into execution by the sovereign power of the respec-
tive parties to the instrument. 352
This passage, one could argue, shows that Marshall endorsed the
broader principle that treaties generally must be "carried into execu-
tion by the sovereign power" in order to effect "the object to be ac-
complished. '353 This argument, though, ignores the sentences imme-
diately after the quoted language:
In the United States a different principle is estab-
lished. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law
of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legisla-
ture, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision. 354
Thus, as others have noted, if one reads the entire passage, rather
than quoting selected portions of it, it is evident that Marshall's
statement that treaties do not effect "the object to be accomplished"
is a statement about treaties in other countries, not treaties in the
United States.355 In Marshall's view, the U.S. Constitution estab-
352. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
353. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 18, at 2087-89 (making
a similar argument).
354. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
355. See Vazquez, Laughing, supra note 18, at 2192-94 (developing this argument in
greater detail).
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lishes "a different principle": the principle that treaties are "to be re-
garded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legisla-
ture."356
The further qualification-that this principle applies when-
ever a treaty "operates of itself'-makes clear that the principle ap-
plies only to executed treaty provisions. But this qualification does
not establish a presumption that treaties are generally executory. To
the contrary, the fact that Percheman overruled Foster, and the fact
that the Supreme Court has never again applied the doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties to deny a remedy to an individual whose treaty
rights were violated, supports the opposite presumption: that treaties
are generally executed (meaning that treaty obligations are to be per-
formed immediately upon entry into force of the treaty) unless the
treaty language makes it abundantly clear that the drafters intended a
particular obligation to be executory (meaning that they did not ex-
pect the obligation to be performed until some time in the future, af-
ter entry into force of the treaty).
The conflict between the nationalist model and the transna-
tionalist model, insofar as it relates to domestic remedies, centers
around the question whether courts have the authority to enforce trea-
ties on behalf of private individuals in the absence of express au-
thorization by the political branches. Between 1789 and 1838, there
were at least fifteen cases, and arguably as many as twenty-one cases,
in which the Supreme Court enforced treaties on behalf of private in-
dividuals without express authorization from the political
branches. 357 These Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the
Court believed that express authorization was not necessary. In
short, the cases demonstrate that the Court understood the role of the
judiciary in treaty enforcement in accordance with the transnational-
ist model, not the nationalist model.
Other decisions by the Supreme Court during this period rein-
force this conclusion. The Court decided fifty-eight cases during this
period in which an individual litigant raised a claim or defense on the
basis of a treaty. In these fifty-eight cases, the Court never said that
treaties are not judicially enforceable unless the treaty itself, or a fed-
356. The Constitution states explicitly that "the Judges in every State shall be bound" by
both treaties and statutes. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers of our Constitution
believed that the principle that treaties are "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature" was sufficiently important that they included that principle in the
text of the Constitution,
357. See Parts IV.A(3) and IV.A(4) (analyzing these twenty-one cases).
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eral statute, creates a private right of action. In these fifty-eight
cases, the Court never endorsed a presumption against judicial en-
forcement of treaties. In fact, several Supreme Court decisions dur-
ing this period contain language that appears to endorse a presump-
tion in favor of judicial enforcement of treaties. 358 Moreover, all
fifty-eight cases are consistent with the transnationalist model. Al-
though Strother, De la Croix, and Foster show that there are limita-
tions on the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial en-
forcement, those cases are consistent with the transnationalist model
because they support, at most, narrow exceptions to the general prin-
ciple that individuals are entitled to judicial remedies for violations of
their treaty-based individual rights.
V. THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MODEL IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
In an amicus brief for the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, the U.S. government asserted: "It is a long-established
presumption that treaties and other international agreements do not
create judicially enforceable individual rights. ' 359 In fact, the "long-
established presumption" is almost precisely the opposite of what the
government claimed. Part Four demonstrated that, during the first
fifty years of U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court consis-
tently applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies for individuals whose treaty rights are violated. Part Five
carries the historical analysis forward, providing a brief sketch of
treaty enforcement in U.S. courts from 1840 to the present. Whereas
the historical analysis in Part Four was comprehensive for the fifty-
year period it covered, the analysis in Part Five is necessarily more
selective.
Part Five is divided into three sections. The first section ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court cases cited by the government in Sanchez-
Llamas and Hamdan in support of the alleged presumption that trea-
ties do not create individually enforceable rights. The analysis shows
358. See, e.g., supra note 50 (quoting Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
344, 348 (1809)); text accompanying note 213 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-110 (1801)); notes 216-18 and accompanying text (analyzing
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)); and note 274 (quoting United States v. Judge
Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 52 (1795)).
359. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11. Similarly, in a merits brief for
the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the government claimed: "The long-established
presumption is that treaties and other international agreements do not create judicially
enforceable rights." Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 30.
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that the Supreme Court has never endorsed that presumption.
The second section documents the Supreme Court's continu-
ing application of the transnationalist model. It discusses three cases
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that illustrate
the Court's application of the transnationalist presumption in favor of
private enforcement of treaties. Since World War II, there have been
relatively few cases where the Court has been forced to choose be-
tween the nationalist and transnationalist presumptions. Even so, the
Court has occasionally applied the transnationalist presumption in fa-
vor of judicial remedies.
The final section shows that the nationalist presumption
against individual enforcement of treaties first arose in a set of fed-
eral circuit court opinions in the 1970s and 1980s. Those cases bor-
rowed from 1970s Supreme Court jurisprudence that established a
presumption against implied rights of action for enforcing federal
statutes. The circuit courts transferred that presumption from the
statutory context to the treaty context. However, the circuit courts
have imposed far more draconian restrictions on private enforcement
of treaties than the Supreme Court has ever applied in the statutory
context.
A. The Supreme Court and the Nationalist Presumption
The government briefs in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas cited
six Supreme Court decisions in support of the nationalist presump-
tion against private enforcement of treaties: Foster v. Neilson,360
Head Money Cases,361 Whitney v. Robertson,362 Charlton v. Kelly,363
Johnson v. Eisentrager,364 and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp.365 The analysis in Part Four above demonstrated that
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Nielson does not sup-
port the nationalist model. This section demonstrates that none of the
other cases cited above supports the nationalist presumption against
private enforcement of treaties.
The government briefs in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas relied
heavily on the following language from the Head Money Cases:
360. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
361. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
362. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
363. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
364. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
365. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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A treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provi-
sions on the interest and the honor of the governments
which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction be-
comes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to
seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by ac-
tual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial
courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. 366
The government, however, disregarded the passage from Head
Money that immediately follows the language just quoted:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer
certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of
the nations residing in the territorial limits of the
other, which partake of the nature of municipal law,
and which are capable of enforcement as between pri-
vate parties in the courts of the country .... The con-
stitution of the United States places such provisions as
these in the same category as other laws of Congress.
. . . A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of
Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject
may be determined. And when such rights are of a na-
ture to be enforced in a court of justice, that court re-
sorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case be-
fore it as it would to a statute.367
Thus, in Head Money, the Supreme Court drew a critical distinction
between treaties that are "primarily a compact between independent
nations," and treaties that "contain provisions which confer certain
rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in
the territorial limits of the other." Head Money explicitly directs
courts to enforce treaty provisions that "prescribe a rule by which the
rights of the private citizen" may be determined. In other words,
Head Money endorses the transnationalist presumption in favor of
private enforcement of treaty provisions that create primary individ-
ual rights.
The government brief in Sanchez-Llamas cited Whitney v.
366. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). See Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief,
supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Head Money); Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting
Head Money).
367. 112 U.S. at 598-99 (emphasis added).
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Robertson368 in support of the proposition that "issues of compliance
with treaty obligations are 'not judicial questions.' 369 As with Head
Money, the government misrepresented what the Court said in Whit-
ney. In Whitney, plaintiffs sued a U.S. customs collector, alleging
that he had imposed a duty on imported goods that should have been
admitted duty-free under a treaty with the Dominican Republic. 370
The Court held, as a matter of treaty interpretation, that the treaty did
not grant the subject goods an exemption from import duties.371 Al-
ternatively, the Court held, even if the plaintiffs had a treaty-based
right to import the goods free of duty, they were not entitled to a
remedy because "[t]he act of Congress under which the duties were
collected authorized their exaction. ' 372 Moreover, that statute was
enacted "after the treaty with the Dominican Republic, and, if there
be any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the re-
quirements of the law, the latter must control. '373 In short, the later-
in-time statute trumped the earlier treaty.
In that context, the Whitney Court added:
[W]hether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign
had given just occasion to the legislative department
of our government to withhold the execution of a
promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct con-
travention of such promise, were not judicial ques-
tions; that the power to determine these matters had
not been confided to the judiciary... but to the execu-
tive and legislative departments of our government
374
In short, if Congress approves legislation that contravenes U.S. treaty
obligations, it is not the judiciary's responsibility to second-guess
that legislative choice. That is a far cry from the government's asser-
tion that Whitney stands for the proposition that "issues of compli-
ance with treaty obligations are 'not judicial questions.' ' 375 The
Court's decision in Whitney provides no support whatsoever for the
government's contention in Sanchez-Llamas, or for the nationalist
368. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
369. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11. Similarly, in Hamdan, the
government cites Whitney for the following proposition: "When a violation of a treaty ...
occurs, it becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, not of judicial
redress." Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 30.
370. 124 U.S. at 190-91.
371. Id. at 192-93.
372. Id. at 193.
373. Id. at 194.
374. Id. at 194-95.
375. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11.
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presumption. 376
The government also cited Charlton v. Kelly377 in support of
the asserted presumption against judicial enforcement of treaties. 378
In Charlton, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief to prevent his ex-
tradition to Italy. 379 He raised four distinct objections to extradition,
relying in part on a treaty between the United States and Italy.380 The
fourth objection is especially pertinent here. 381 Petitioner contended
that the U.S. treaty obligation to extradite him to Italy was no longer
operative because Italy had breached its treaty obligations. The
Court agreed that a treaty violation by Italy "would have justified the
United States in denouncing the treaty as no longer obligatory, [but]
it did not automatically have that effect," and added, "[the treaty] was
only voidable, not void .... -382 Since the political branches had
chosen not to abrogate the treaty, the U.S. obligation to extradite peti-
tioner to Italy remained "in full force and effect," and the Court had a
duty to enforce that obligation. 383
In the context of addressing petitioner's argument, the Court
in Charlton quoted language from Moore's International Law Digest,
which in turn quoted the aforementioned passage from Head Money
Cases.384 As noted above, Head Money actually supports the trans-
nationalist model, not the nationalist model. Moreover, Charlton
cited this passage in support of the proposition that the Court was ob-
ligated to enforce the extradition treaty with Italy, notwithstanding
Italy's alleged breach of the treaty. 385 Thus, Charlton provides no
support for the nationalist presumption against judicial enforcement
of treaties.
The government brief in Hamdan relied heavily on a single
footnote in Johnson v. Eisentrager386 to support its assertion that the
1949 POW Convention is not judicially enforceable. 387 That foot-
note, referring to the 1929 Geneva Convention, not the 1949 POW
376. 124 U.S. at 194-95.
377. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
378. Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11; Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note
3, at 30.
379. 229 U.S. at 448.
380. Id. at 457.
381. With respect to the first three objections, see id. at 457-69.
382. Id. at 473.
383. Id. at 476.
384. Id. at 474 (quoting 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at
366 (1906) (quoting, in turn, Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
385. See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 474.
386. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
387. See Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 31-34 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)).
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Convention, stated as follows: "It is, however, the obvious scheme
of the Agreement that responsibility for observance and enforcement
of these rights is upon political and military authorities. Rights of
alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and inter-
vention of protecting powers .. . . 388 On its face, this statement does
not say anything about a presumption against judicial enforcement of
treaties. It merely asserts that a particular treaty, which was not at is-
sue in Hamdan, was designed to be enforced through diplomatic
measures. In any case, that footnote has no precedential value be-
cause it is included in a portion of the Eisentrager opinion addressing
an issue that was never argued before the Supreme Court, and that
the Court, according to its own holding in the case, lacked jurisdic-
tion to decide. 38 9
Moreover, the logic of the Eisentrager footnote is seriously
flawed. That logic can be summarized as follows: the 1929 Geneva
Convention is not judicially enforceable because the Convention pro-
vides expressly for international dispute resolution, but it says noth-
ing about domestic judicial enforcement. 390 This rationale is incon-
sistent with numerous Supreme Court precedents. For example, in
Chew Heong v. United States,39' the Court granted habeas relief to a
Chinese laborer who was detained in violation of an 1880 treaty be-
tween the United States and China.392 The treaty said nothing about
domestic judicial enforcement. 393 Moreover, the treaty provided ex-
pressly for diplomatic negotiations to resolve issues related to treaty
implementation. 394 Nevertheless, the Court granted the writ of ha-
beas corpus. In addition to Chew Heong, there are numerous cases in
which the Supreme Court has approved domestic judicial enforce-
ment of a treaty that was silent with respect to domestic judicial en-
forcement, but provided expressly for international dispute resolu-
tion.395 Thus, the treaty makers' decision to provide for international
388. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14.
389. See id. See also supra note 124.
390. See Gov't Hamdan Brief, supra note 3, at 31-34 (elaborating this argument from
the Eisentrager footnote).
391. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
392. Id. at 538-39.
393. See Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826.
394. See id. art. IV (stipulating that, if the United States adopts measures that "are found
to work hardship upon the subjects of China, the Chinese Minister at Washington may bring
the matter to the notice of the Secretary of State of the United States, who will consider the
subject with him; and the Chinese Foreign Office may also bring the matter to the notice of
the United States Minister at Peking and consider the subject with him, to the end that
mutual and unqualified benefit may result.").
395. See, e.g., Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 489 (1824) (granting remedy for
violation of Article 9 of Jay Treaty, even though Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, and 15 of that treaty
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negotiation, without more, cannot support an inference that the treaty
makers intended to bar domestic judicial remedies.
Finally, the government brief in Sanchez-Llamas cited Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess396 in support of the assertion that
"there is a presumption that a treaty will be enforced through political
and diplomatic channels, rather than through the courts. '397 In Ame-
rada Hess, two Liberian corporations sued the Argentine Republic in
a U.S. court after an Argentine military plane bombed a Liberian oil
tanker. 398 Argentina invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) in support of its sovereign immunity defense. 399 The Court
held that the FSIA was "the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
a foreign state in our courts," 400 and that the FSIA "does not author-
ize jurisdiction over a foreign state in this situation."' 401 Plaintiffs ar-
gued that two treaties to which the United States and Argentina were
both parties "create an exception to the FSIA .... -402 The Court ac-
knowledged that a treaty could waive a foreign state's sovereign im-
munity, but said that the treaty would have to contain an express
waiver to achieve that result, and the treaties invoked by the plaintiffs
contained no such express waivers.40 3 In any case, the Court's insis-
tence that a treaty must contain an express waiver to overcome for-
eign sovereign immunity, which is protected by the FSIA, provides
no support for the government's claim that there is a presumption
against judicial enforcement of treaties.
In sum, although the government presumably devoted hun-
dreds of hours of legal research to the task of identifying legal au-
thority for the nationalist presumption, it was unable to find a single
Supreme Court decision that provides any support whatsoever for
that presumption. The government's utter failure to find any Su-
preme Court authority for its preferred position leads inescapably to
the conclusion that the Supreme Court has never endorsed the nation-
alist presumption.
provide expressly for international dispute resolution); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
453 (1819) (enforcing Article 9 of Jay Treaty); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 594
(1818) (enforcing Article 9 of Jay Treaty); Jackson v. Clarke, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 1 (1818)
(enforcing Article 9 of Jay Treaty); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
603 (1812) (enforcing Article 9 of Jay Treaty); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Insurance Co., 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 185 (1808) (enforcing Article 18 of Jay Treaty).
396. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
397. See Gov't Sanchez-Llamas Brief, supra note 3, at 11-12.
398. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 431-32.
399. See id. at 428.
400. Id. at 434.
401. Id. at431.
402. Id. at 442.
403. Id. at 442-43.
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B. The Continued Vitality of the Transnationalist Model
The transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies
for violations of individual treaty rights is not merely a relic of the
past. The Supreme Court continued to apply that presumption
throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
century. In the years since World War II, the Court has generally
avoided the need to decide questions involving domestic remedies for
treaty violations by adopting narrow treaty interpretations that restrict
the scope of treaty-based primary rights. Even so, the Court has al-
ready decided one case in the early twenty-first century that applied a
variant of the transnationalist presumption. The first sub-section be-
low discusses three cases that illustrate the Court's continued appli-
cation of the transnationalist presumption before World War II. The
second sub-section addresses developments since World War II.
1. The Transnationalist Presumption in the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries
In Chew Heong v. United States,404 a Chinese laborer who
was detained on a ship near San Francisco filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion in federal court to obtain release from custody.40 5 Chew Heong
alleged that his detention violated Article II of an 1880 treaty be-
tween the United States and China, which stated: "Chinese laborers
who are now in the United States shall be allowed to go and come of
their own free will . . .,406 The treaty itself did not grant Chew
Heong a right of access to a U.S. court, nor did it expressly grant him
the power to invoke the treaty before one. Even so, the Supreme
Court granted Chew Heong's habeas petition, holding that he was
"entitled to enter and remain in the United States. '40 7 In short, the
Court applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies. The treaty was judicially enforceable because the treaty
granted petitioner a primary individual right to remain in the United
States, and the federal habeas statute granted him a right of action to
enforce that primary right.
With respect to the judicial enforcement of treaty rights,
Chew Heong is indistinguishable from Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Like
the petitioner in Chew Heong, the petitioner in Hamdan brought a
404. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
405. Id. at 538.
406. Treaty Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, art. 11, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826.
407. Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 560.
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habeas corpus action against the federal government to enforce pri-
mary individual rights protected by a treaty (the POW Convention)
that does not grant the petitioner a private right of action. The major-
ity in Hamdan ducked the question whether petitioner could utilize
the habeas statute to enforce his treaty-based primary rights. 40 8 Re-
gardless, Chew Heong provides strong support for Hamdan's argu-
ment that the federal habeas statute provides a private right of action
that enables him to enforce his primary rights under the POW Con-
vention.409
In United States v. Rauscher,410 the appellee had been extra-
dited from Great Britain to the United States to be tried for murder.
After his extradition to the United States, he was indicted for and
convicted of cruel and unusual punishment.411 On appeal, Rauscher
challenged his criminal conviction on the ground that it violated Arti-
cle X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.412 Article X listed specific
offenses for which individuals could be extradited under the treaty,
including the crime of murder.413 However, the crime of "cruel and
unusual punishment"--the crime for which he was charged and con-
victed-was not one of the offenses enumerated in the treaty. More-
over, it was not the crime for which he had been extradited. Accord-
ingly, the Court held that "the prisoner, under the extradition treaty
with Great Britain, having been surrendered upon a charge of murder,
acquire[d] a right to be exempt from prosecution upon the charge set
forth in the indictment .... ,,414
It is worth quoting the Rauscher opinion at length because it
provides a classic expression of the Court's endorsement of the
transnationalist model:
[U]nder the doctrine that the treaty is the supreme law
of the land, and is to be observed by all the courts,
state and national, 'anything in the laws of the states
to the contrary notwithstanding,' if the state court
408. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (discussing Hamdan).
409. The federal habeas statute authorizes courts to grant habeas relief for any
individual who "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
410. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
411. Id. at 409.
412. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. X, Aug. 9, 1842, reprinted in 4
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 363, 369-79
(Hunter Miller ed., Gov't Printing Office 1934).
413. Id.
414. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409. The language quoted is taken from the question
certified to the Supreme Court. The Court answered the question in the affirmative. See id.
at 433.
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should fail to give due effect to the rights of the party
under the treaty, a remedy is found in the judicial
branch of the Federal government, which has been
fully recognized. This remedy is by a writ of error...
. If the party, however, is under arrest and desires a
more speedy remedy in order to secure his release, a
writ of habeas corpus from one of the Federal judges
or Federal courts ... will bring him before a Federal
tribunal .... State courts also could issue such a writ,
and thus the judicial remedy is complete, when the ju-
risdiction of the court is admitted. This is a complete
answer to the proposition that the rights of persons ex-
tradited under the treaty cannot be enforced by the ju-
dicial branch of the government, and that they can
only appeal to the executive branches of the treaty
governments for redress.415
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not expressly empower
Rauscher to invoke Article X as a defense to criminal charges. Nev-
ertheless, the Court applied the transnationalist presumption in favor
of judicial remedies, reasoning that a criminal defendant who has
been harmed by a violation of his treaty-based primary rights has the
power to invoke that treaty as a defense to a criminal prosecution,
even if the treaty is silent with respect to domestic judicial remedies.
Accordingly, the Court granted Rauscher a judicial remedy for the
violation of his treaty-based individual rights by reversing his crimi-
nal conviction. Rauscher is indistinguishable from modem cases
where criminal defendants have sought judicial remedies for viola-
tions of their treaty-based rights under the VCCR.
The Supreme Court continued to apply the transnationalist
presumption in favor of private enforcement of individual treaty
rights in the early twentieth century. In Asakura v. City of Seattle,416
the plaintiff was a Japanese national who operated a pawnbroker
business in Seattle.417 Seattle passed an ordinance that prohibited
non-U.S. citizens from operating a pawnbroker business in the
city.4 18 Plaintiff sued to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on the
grounds that it violated a bilateral treaty with Japan.419 The treaty
granted Japanese citizens a primary right "to carry on trade" in the
415. Id. at430-31.
416. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
417. Id. at 339.
418. Id. at 339-40.
419. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504.
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United States "upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects. '420
However, the treaty did not expressly grant Japanese citizens a right
to sue for injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court af-
firmed an injunction in favor of the plaintiff.
In sum, the Court continued to apply the transnationalist pre-
sumption in favor of judicial remedies during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
2. Developments Since World War II
In the years since World War II, there have been few cases
where the Supreme Court has been forced to choose between the na-
tionalist and transnationalist presumptions. The dearth of such cases
is attributable to two factors. The first relates to treaty-based rights
of action. The second relates to treaty interpretation.
Modem friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties ("FCN
treaties") typically include an express private right of action. Ac-
cordingly, in post-World War II cases such as Clark v. Allen421 and
Kolovrat v. Oregon,422 where the Supreme Court enforced FCN trea-
ties on behalf of individual litigants, foreign nationals could point to
express treaty provisions that granted them a right of access to U.S.
courts.423 Given those express treaty provisions, the Court had no
need to apply a presumption for or against domestic judicial reme-
dies.
In contrast, FCN treaties concluded in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries often did not contain express private rights
of action. Thus, in cases enforcing those treaties, the Court routinely
applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies
420. Id. art. I.
421. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
422. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
423. In Clark, the Court enforced the Treaty Between the United States and Germany of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, U.S.-F.R.G., Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132
[hereinafter U.S.-Germany Treaty], on behalf of German nationals. 331 U.S. at 507-14
(upholding right of German nationals to inherit real property in California). Article I of the
treaty with Germany created an express private right of action. See U.S.-Germany Treaty,
supra ("The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall enjoy freedom of access to courts
of justice of the other ... as well for the prosecution as for the defense of their rights ....").
In Kolovrat, the Court enforced the Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of
America and Serbia, U.S.-Serb. & Mont., Oct. 14, 1881, 22 Stat. 963 [hereinafter U.S.-
Serbia Treaty], on behalf of Yugoslav nationals. 366 U.S. at 192-96 (upholding right of
Yugoslav nationals to inherit personal property in Oregon). Article IV of the treaty with
Serbia created an express private right of action. See U.S.-Serbia Treaty, supra ("They shall
have reciprocally free access to the courts of justice ... both for the prosecution and for the
defence of their rights .... ).
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to ensure the availability of domestic judicial remedies for individu-
als whose treaty rights were violated.424. It bears, emphasis that mod-
em Supreme Court cases enforcing FCN treaties, such as Clark and
Kolovrat, provide no indication that the Supreme Court was even
aware that the subject treaties contained provisions creating a private
right of action.425 The analysis in those cases proceeds as if the Court
simply did not care whether the treaties at issue created a private
cause of action. Thus, Clark and Kolovrat are entirely consistent
with the transnationalist model.
The second key factor is that the Supreme Court's approach
to treaty interpretation has changed substantially since World War II.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court routinely
applied the twin canons of good faith and liberal interpretation in
cases raising treaty interpretation questions.426 Application of these
canons generally led the Court to adopt an expansive view of the
scope of primary individual rights protected by treaties. 427 Because it
adopted an expansive view of primary rights, the Court frequently
found violations of those treaty-based primary rights. Having found
a violation, the Court was forced to make decisions about available
remedies. In cases where the treaty did not provide expressly for
domestic judicial remedies, the Court applied the transnationalist pre-
sumption in favor of judicial remedies to fill the gap.
In the years since World War II, the canon of deference to the
executive branch has largely supplanted the canons of good faith and
liberal interpretation. 42 8 Whereas judicial application of the twin
canons of good faith and liberal interpretation typically led the Court
to adopt an expansive view of the scope of treaty-based primary
rights, deference to the executive branch typically leads the Court to
adopt a narrow view of the scope of individual rights protected by
424. See, e.g., Cameal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825) (enforcing art. 11 of
1778 treaty with France); Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185 (1808)
(enforcing art. 18 of Jay Treaty); Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 319 (1796)
(enforcing art. 19 of 1778 treaty with France); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 133 (1795)
(enforcing art. 19 of 1782 treaty with Netherlands).
425. See Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 192-96; Clark, 331 U.S. at 507-14.
426. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 1907-14 (documenting the Court's
reliance on the good faith and liberal interpretation canons).
427. See supra Part II.B.
428. See Bederman, Deference or Deception, supra note 19, at 1464-66 (reviewing
treaty cases under the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts and concluding that "judicial
deference to the Executive's position on treaty interpretation is the single best predictor of
interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases"). See also Van Alstine, supra note 16, at
1914-19 (documenting the fact that the Court has ceased applying the twin canons of good
faith and liberal interpretation).
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treaties. 429 That narrow view, in turn, means that the Court rarely
finds that an individual's treaty rights have been violated. Without a
finding of a treaty violation, there is no need for the Court to consider
the question of domestic remedies. In sum, the Court's treaty juris-
prudence since World War II has generally combined a transnational-
ist "rights-focused" methodology430 with the nationalist canon of def-
erence to the executive branch. This approach has enabled the Court
to dodge the question whether there is a presumption for or against
individual enforcement of treaty rights by holding, in the majority of
cases, that the individual's rights were not violated.
Despite the trends described above, the Court has occasion-
ally applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies in the post-World-War II era. The most prominent recent
example is the Court's decision in American Insurance Ass'n. v.
Garamendi.431 In Garamendi, a trade association sued to enjoin en-
forcement of a California statute that required insurance companies
to disclose information about "insurance policies issued to persons in
Europe, which were in effect between 1920 and 1945."432 The plain-
tiffs argued that the federal policy embodied in certain bilateral
agreements between the United States and European governments
preempted the California law.433 The international agreements mani-
429. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 179-87 (1993)
(adopting executive's interpretation of Article 33 of the U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and holding that Article 33 does not protect Haitian refugees
apprehended by U.S. government officers on the high seas beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 64-71 (1993)
(adopting executive's interpretation of two different international customs conventions, and
denying relief to domestic corporation that claimed that treaties granted it immunity from
state tax liability for certain international transactions); United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 662-70 (1992) (adopting executive's interpretation of U.S.-Mexico
extradition treaty, and holding that Drug Enforcement Administration agents did not violate
treaty when they orchestrated the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor from his home in Mexico,
and his forcible abduction to the United States to stand trial on federal criminal charges);
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-53 (1991) (adopting executive's
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, and holding that Article 17 did not allow plaintiffs
to recover for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical injury); O'Connor v.
United States, 479 U.S. 27, 29-35 (1986) (adopting executive's interpretation of Article XV
of the Agreement in Implementation of the Panama Canal Treaty and holding that Article
XV does not grant U.S. citizen employees of the Panama Canal Commission an exemption
from U.S. income tax for salaries paid by the Commission).
430. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
431. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
432. Id. at 409 (citing Cal. Ins. Code § 13,804(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
433. See id. at 413 ("The principal argument for preemption made by petitioners ... is
that [California state law] interferes with foreign policy of the Executive Branch, as
expressed principally in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and France.")
The preemption analysis in Garamendi relies primarily on three bilateral executive
agreements: Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the
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fest the drafters' expectations that the federal government might in-
voke the agreements in support of motions to dismiss private law-
suits.434 In Garamendi, though, the insurance companies invoked the
agreements offensively in support of a suit against the state Insurance
Commissioner to enjoin enforcement of a California statute. 435 There
is no language in any of the international agreements indicating that
the drafters intended to authorize this type of private lawsuit. Even
so, the Court granted relief to plaintiffs on the grounds that the for-
eign policy embodied in those agreements preempted California
law.436 The Court's opinion does not identify the source of the plain-
tiff's private right of action. Regardless, it is clear that the Court tac-
itly applied the transnationalist presumption in favor of judicial
remedies because there was no federal statute or treaty that author-
ized the private lawsuit in Garamendi.
Garamendi differs from earlier cases applying the transna-
tionalist presumption in two respects. First, the agreements at issue
were not "treaties" in the constitutional sense of that term because
they had not been approved by the Senate; they were executive
agreements concluded by the President. Second, the Court did not
say it was enforcing the agreements as such. Rather, the Court said it
was enforcing the foreign policy embodied in those agreements. 437
These differences highlight the continued vitality of the transnation-
alist presumption. Garamendi demonstrates that the Supreme Court
believes it has the authority to enforce, at the behest of private par-
ties, the foreign policy embodied in an international agreement of a
type that is not mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, even if there is
no treaty or statute that grants the plaintiff a private right of action. If
that belief is correct, then the Court must also have the authority to
enforce, at the behest of private parties, the legal obligations embod-
Future," U.S.-F.R.G, July 17, 2000, 39 LL.M. 1298 [hereinafter U.S.-Germany Agreement];
Agreement Concerning the Austrian Fund "Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation," U.S.-
Austria, Oct. 24, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 523; Agreement Concerning Payments for Certain Losses
Suffered During World War II, U.S.-Fr.,'Jan. 18, 2001, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-36, 2001
WL 416465.
434. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Agreement, supra note 433, art. 2(1) ("The United States
shall, in all cases in which the United States is notified that a claim described in Article 1(1)
has been asserted in a court in the United States, inform its courts ... that dismissal of such
cases would be in its foreign policy interest.").
435. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 412.
436. See id. at 420-29.
437. See id. at 416-17 ("[I]f the agreements here had expressly preempted [state] laws.
the issue would be straightforward. But petitioners . . . have to acknowledge that the
agreements include no preemption clause, and so leave their claim of preemption to rest on
asserted interference with the foreign policy those agreements embody.") (citations omitted).
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ied in a treaty that is the "supreme Law of the Land,"438 regardless of
the presence or absence of a statutory or treaty-based private cause of
action.
This statement is not meant to imply that the Court has un-
bounded authority to enforce treaty obligations in any private lawsuit.
Context is important. In Garamendi, the plaintiffs sought prospec-
tive, injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of a state law that con-
flicted with international agreements. 439 The Supreme Court has rou-
tinely allowed private plaintiffs to bring claims for prospective,
injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of state laws that conflict with
federal statutes, even in cases where the statute at issue does not cre-
ate a private right of action.440 The main rationale for allowing plain-
tiffs to bring these "Shaw preemption claims," 441 even without a fed-
eral statutory cause of action, is that Shaw preemption claims are
necessary to preserve the rule of law and to maintain the supremacy
of federal law.442 That rationale applies with equal force in cases
where plaintiffs sue to enjoin enforcement of state laws that conflict
with federal treaties.443 Moreover, there is an additional rationale
that applies in treaty cases: these types of suits are necessary to en-
sure U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations. Thus, the Shaw pre-
emption line of cases supports the continued application of the trans-
nationalist presumption in favor of judicial remedies, at least in cases
where plaintiffs sue to enjoin enforcement of state laws that are al-
legedly preempted by international agreements.
438. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
439. The term "conflict" here is deliberately ambiguous.
440. See David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 355, 390-401 (2004) (analyzing cases). See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 47-48 (5th ed. Supp. 2005)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
441. The label is taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), in which the Court permitted private plaintiffs to seek a declaration
that federal law preempted state law.
442. See Sloss, supra note 440, at 401-03. In contrast, suits between private parties for
money damages do not implicate rule of law and federal supremacy concerns to the same
extent. Accordingly, the Court has insisted that plaintiffs must identify a federal statutory
cause of action to support these types of claims.
443. See David Sloss, Ex parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty
Violations, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1193-1202 (2000) (contending that the rationale
supporting the Shaw preemption line of cases applies equally to some treaty-based
preemption claims).
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C. The Origins of the Presumption Against Judicial Enforcement
of Treaties
The presumption that treaties do not create individually en-
forceable rights emerged when lower federal courts combined two
previously separate lines of cases: one related to the doctrine of non-
self-executing treaties, and the other related to implied rights of ac-
tion. Dreyfus v. Von Finck,44 decided by the Second Circuit in 1976,
was the first case that linked the concept of a non-self-executing
treaty to the concept of a private right of action. In Dreyfus, the court
initially stated that a treaty is self-executing "when it prescribes rules
by which private rights may be determined. '445 This definition of
"self-executing" can be traced to the Supreme Court's decision in
Head Money Cases.446 It says that a treaty is self-executing, and
therefore judicially enforceable, when it creates primary individual
rights. This is the transnationalist model. However, at the very end
of its discussion of self-executing treaties, the Dreyfus court added
"that the District Court was correct in holding that no private right of
action could be based on the four treaties referred to in plaintiffs
complaint. ' 447 By linking the concept of non-self-executing treaties
to the concept of a private right of action, the Second Circuit initiated
a transformation in legal doctrine.
The next step in the process of doctrinal transformation was
the Third Circuit's 1979 decision in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp.4 4 8 In Mannington Mills, the court cited Head Money
Cases and Dreyfus in support of the following statement: "Thus,
unless a treaty is self-executing, it must be implemented by legisla-
tion before it gives rise to a private cause of action."449 In Dreyfus,
the Second Circuit used the term "private right of action" only once;
its analysis focused on the question whether the treaties at issue cre-
ated primary individual rights.450 In Mannington Mills, though, the
Third Circuit used the terms "private right of action" and "private
cause of action" repeatedly. 45' Its entire analysis focused on the
question whether the treaty at issue created a private right of action.
Thus, Mannington Mills initiated a shift from the transnationalist
444. 534 F.2d 24.
445. Id. at 30.
446. 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
447. 534 F.2d at 30.
448. 595 F.2d 1287.
449. Id. at 1298.
450. 534 F.2d at 29-30.
451. 595 F.2d at 1298-99.
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"rights-focused" methodology to the nationalist "remedies-focused"
methodology. But Mannington Mills did not endorse the nationalist
presumption against private enforcement of treaties.
Robert Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,452 decided by the D.C. Circuit in 1984, was the first judi-
cial opinion that unambiguously endorsed the nationalist presumption
against private enforcement of individual treaty rights. In Tel-Oren,
Judge Bork succinctly summarized the core elements of the national-
ist model in two sentences: "Treaties of the United States, though the
law of the land, do not generally create rights that are privately en-
forceable in courts. Absent authorizing legislation, an individual has
access to courts for enforcement of a treaty's provisions only when
the treaty is self-executing, that is, when it expressly or impliedly
provides a private right of action. '453 The first sentence establishes a
presumption against private enforcement of treaties. The second sen-
tence indicates that an individual can overcome that presumption by
showing that Congress has authorized private enforcement, or by
showing that the treaty itself creates a private right of action. This is
the nationalist model.
In retrospect, it is not surprising that the nationalist model
emerged from a series of federal appellate cases decided in the late
1970s and early 1980s. In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, 454 the Supreme Court
elaborated a four-part test for finding an implied private right of ac-
tion to enforce a federal statute.455 Over the next few years, the four-
part test evolved into a one-part test that focused narrowly on the
question whether Congress intended to create a private right of ac-
tion.456 Since 1979, the Supreme Court, in practice, has applied a
strong presumption against recognizing implied private rights of ac-
tion in cases where individual plaintiffs sue other private parties to
enforce rights under federal statutes. 457 In Dreyfus v. Von Finck,
Mannington Mills, and Tel-Oren, federal judges transplanted the Su-
preme Court's implied right of action jurisprudence from the statu-
tory context to the treaty context. However, that doctrinal innovation
produced significant changes in both non-self-execution doctrine and
implied right of action doctrine whose implications have not yet been
fully appreciated.
Prior to the advent of the nationalist model in the 1970s and
452. 726 F.2d 774, 798.
453. Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
454. 422 U.S. 66.
455. See id. at 78.
456. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
457. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 440, at 781-82.
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1980s, non-self-execution doctrine had not generated a substantial
right-remedy gap in the domestic law of treaties. Courts applying
non-self-execution doctrine generally followed the test articulated by
the Supreme Court in Head Money Cases: an individual can enforce
a treaty in a U.S. court "whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by
which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be deter-
mined. '458 Under the Head Money test, there was little or no right-
remedy gap because treaties that protected primary individual rights
were at least presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts. Granted,
there were other versions of non-self-execution doctrine, but those
other versions were generally consistent with the maxim "where
there is a right, there is a remedy. '459 The nationalist model replaced
the Head Money primary rights test with a private right of action test.
The nationalist right of action test creates a huge gap between treaty-
based rights and domestic judicial remedies because most treaties
that protect individual rights do not create an express private right of
action. By severing the link between rights and remedies in domestic
law, the nationalist model creates a substantial gap between U.S. in-
ternational obligations and the domestic performance of those obliga-
tions, thereby generating friction between the United States and its
treaty partners.
The nationalist model also deviates substantially from the im-
plied right of action doctrine that the Supreme Court has developed
in the context of federal statutes.460 In cases involving federal stat-
utes, the Court has applied a presumption against implied rights of
action in suits between private parties. 46' However, the Court has not
458. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1885). See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242
P.2d 617, 619-22 (Cal. 1952) (applying the Head Money test and concluding that the human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are not self-executing).
459. Prior to the emergence of the nationalist model, there were three different versions
of non-self-execution doctrine. The first version was the Head Money version, which did
not create a substantial right-remedy gap. (The Head Money version is a variant of the
original Foster version. See Sloss, supra note 18, at 19-29.). A second version holds that
implementing legislation is constitutionally required to give effect to some treaty provisions.
See Sloss, supra note 18, at 29-35. That version of non-self-execution doctrine does not
create a right-remedy gap because it applies primarily to treaty provisions that obligate the
United States to appropriate money, and such treaty provisions do not create individual
rights. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1965, created a
third version of non-self-execution doctrine. See Sloss, supra note 18, at 12-18, 70-75. The
Restatement doctrine does create a right-remedy gap, but very few courts applied the
doctrine before 1984, when Judge Bork published his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, supra
note 452. The leading example is United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-84 (5th Cir.
1979) (applying the Restatement doctrine and holding that Article 6 of the Convention on
the High Seas is not self-executing).
460. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 440, at 766-89.
461. Id.
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typically applied such a presumption in suits that pit private individu-
als against government officers. 462 Private plaintiffs can still bring
suit against state and local government officers under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to enforce federal statutes that do not create a private right of
action, as long as the statute they seek to enforce creates primary in-
dividual rights.463 Plaintiffs can also bring suit against federal gov-
ernment officers under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
enjoin federal executive action that violates a federal statute, even if
the statute does not create a private right of action.464 Any person
who is detained by state or federal officers "in violation of the...
laws . . . of the United States" can file a habeas corpus petition to ob-
tain release from custody;465 it has never been necessary for a habeas
petitioner to show that the federal statute that the officer is violating
creates a private right of action. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
never suggested that an individual whom the government subjects to
criminal prosecution must show that a federal statute creates a private
right of action in order to invoke that statute as a defense to a crimi-
nal charge.
In short, although the Supreme Court has endorsed a pre-
sumption against recognizing implied rights of action under federal
statutes, there are a wide variety of remedial mechanisms that enable
individual litigants to enforce federal statutory rights, even when the
statute at issue does not create a private right of action. The national-
ist model, in contrast, precludes the use of any remedial mecha-
nism-by criminal defendants, habeas petitioners, or civil plain-
tiffs-to enforce treaty-based individual rights unless the treaty itself
462. In Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Court did apply the
presumption against implied rights of action in a suit against a state government officer.
However, the Court's decision in Sandoval is difficult to reconcile with at least ten other
Supreme Court decisions in the period from 1984 to 2001 in which the Court authorized
private lawsuits against government officers to enforce federal statutes that did not create a
private right of action. See Sloss, supra note 443.
463. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) ("Once a plaintiff
demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable
by § 1983.").
464. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004) (where
plaintiffs sued to enforce a statute that did not create a private right of action, Justice Scalia,
writing for a unanimous court, held that "[tihe APA authorizes suit" for federal statutory
violations "[w]here no other statute provides a private right of action").
465. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (extending the writ of habeas corpus to any person who "is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"). See also
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (authorizing federal courts to "entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court...
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States"); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (authorizing habeas relief for federal prisoners "upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States").
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creates a private right of action, or Congress has authorized private
enforcement of the treaty. Thus, the nationalist model imposes far
more draconian constraints on the judicial enforcement of treaty
rights than the Supreme Court has imposed on the judicial enforce-
ment of statutory rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
We can learn much about the legal thought of past genera-
tions by focusing on what the courts did not say. The propositions
that did not need to be stated because courts took them for granted
may be as revealing as what the courts did say. During the first fifty
years of U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court consistently
decided treaty cases in accordance with the transnationalist model:
they assumed that treaties have the status of law in our domestic con-
stitutional system, that some treaty provisions create primary rights
for individuals, and that individuals whose treaty rights are violated
are entitled to remedies in domestic courts. The Court occasionally
stated these assumptions explicitly. However, the best evidence that
the Justices shared these assumptions is the Court's consistent record
of awarding remedies to individuals whose treaty rights were vio-
lated, even in cases where the political branches had not authorized
the courts to provide remedies for treaty violations. Thus, the nation-
alist claim that there is a long-standing presumption that treaties do
not create individually enforceable rights is utterly false. The truth is
that the transnationalist model explains the actual record of Supreme
Court decisions in treaty cases for most of U.S. history.
This does not mean that the nationalist presumption against
private enforcement of treaties is indefensible. Rather, it means that
the nationalists cannot win the debate by citing precedents that do not
actually support their position. The strongest defense of the national-
ist model is an argument that relies on changed circumstances. The
world is a very different place today than it was in 1789, or 1839, or
even 1939. The United States is a superpower; we confront enemies
who have demonstrated their willingness to use unconventional
means to attack us. There is a considerable risk that some of those
enemies may acquire weapons of mass destruction. In these circum-
stances, the President arguably needs a greater degree of flexibility in
framing and implementing national security policy than he did 100 or
200 years ago. During the twentieth century, the Court adopted sev-
eral doctrinal innovations that supported the increasing concentration
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of foreign affairs power in the executive branch.466 Nationalists may
contend that adoption of the nationalist presumption against private
enforcement of treaties would be a sensible next step in the evolution
of foreign affairs doctrine.
If the Court takes this step, though, it should acknowledge
honestly that it is embracing a novel doctrinal innovation. Moreover,
before the Court endorses this doctrinal innovation, it should consider
the potential negative consequences. Adoption of the nationalist pre-
sumption against private enforcement of treaties would yield three
different types of harmful consequences. These relate to federal su-
premacy, separation of powers, and U.S. foreign relations.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government
was powerless to halt treaty violations by state government offi-
cers.467 The Framers solved this problem by including treaties in the
text of the Supremacy Clause: they gave treaties the status of su-
preme federal law and made treaties directly binding on state
courts.4 6 8 In recent years, state and local governments have routinely
violated U.S. obligations under Article 36 of the VCCR,469 just as
state governments violated U.S. treaty obligations before adoption of
the Constitution. The treaty violations persist because state courts
and lower federal courts have invoked the nationalist presumption
against private enforcement as a justification for their refusal to en-
force the treaty. 470 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,471 the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to halt the ongoing treaty violations, but it
failed to deliver. The Court in Sanchez-Llamas did not endorse the
nationalist presumption against private enforcement of treaties.472
However, the Court applied a nationalist approach to treaty interpre-
tation,473 adopting a restrictive view of the scope of legal protection
466. See White, supra note 23.
467. See Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 18, at 1101-04.
468. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stipulating that treaties are "the supreme Law of the
Land" and that "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby"). See also Vazquez, Treaty-
Based Rights, supra note 18, at 1104-10; Flaherty, supra note 18, at 2120-26.
469. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
470. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005). See also supra notes
69, 70, 74-77 and accompanying text.
471. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
472. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
473. Recall that the transnationalist model applies the twin canons of good faith and
liberal interpretation, whereas the nationalist model applies the canon of deference to the
executive branch. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. The Court in Sanchez-
Llamas explicitly invoked the nationalist canon of deference to the executive branch in
support of its decision. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685. In contrast, the Court's
opinion makes no reference to the canons of good faith and liberal interpretation. Moreover,
the Court's decision is contrary to both those canons. The canon of good faith counsels
courts to interpret a treaty in accordance with the agreed international understanding of its
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accorded to foreign nationals under the treaty. By restricting the
range of judicial remedies available to individual victims of Article
36 violations, the Court effectively signaled to state and local officers
that they can continue to violate the treaty without fearing judicial
sanctions. 474 Thus, application of the nationalist model perpetuates
the very problem of treaty violations by state officers that the Fram-
ers thought they solved by including treaties in the text of the Su-
premacy Clause.
The second harmful consequence associated with the nation-
alist model relates to separation of powers. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Supreme Court ruled that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions is a part of U.S. federal law, that Common Article 3 grants
rights to individual Guantanamo detainees, and that it would violate
the rights of those detainees to subject them to trial by military com-
mission.475 If the Court had endorsed the nationalist presumption
against private enforcement of treaties, it might well have ruled that
the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable. 476 In that
case, the Court would presumably have denied relief to Hamdan on
the grounds that individual claimants cannot enforce the Geneva
Conventions in U.S. courts. Thus, even though the Supreme Court
held that the proposed military commission proceedings violate fed-
eral law, and that they violate Hamdan's federal rights, a court apply-
ing the nationalist presumption would disclaim the power to halt
those ongoing violations. That type of rationale is squarely at odds
with core rule-of-law principles. When federal courts turn a blind
terms, but the Sanchez-Llamas majority explicitly rejected the agreed international
understanding of Article 36 of the VCCR, as reflected in decisions by the International Court
of Justice. See id. at 2683-86. The canon of liberal interpretation counsels courts to
interpret a treaty to provide the broadest possible protection for the rights of foreign
nationals, but the Court interpreted Article 36 in a manner that left both petitioners, and
countless other foreign nationals, without any meaningful remedy for the acknowledged
violation of their treaty-based individual rights.
474. The Court specifically rejected two proposed remedies for Article 36 violations:
application of the exclusionary rule and preemption of state procedural default rules to
enable individuals to raise Article 36 claims in post-conviction proceedings in state court.
See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2678-87. The Court's opinion leaves open the possibility
that individuals can obtain judicial remedies for Article 36 violations by raising ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. However,
since this remedial mechanism does not affect the state officers who violated the treaty in the
first place, it provides no incentive for them to comply with the treaty.
475. See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793-97 (2006).
476. Even if the Court adopted the nationalist presumption against private enforcement,
it could reasonably have held that the federal habeas statute grants individuals a private right
of action that empowers them to enforce the Geneva Conventions by filing a habeas corpus
petition. However, courts that have endorsed the nationalist presumption have generally
held that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable in a habeas corpus action.
See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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eye to executive action that violates federal law, they distort the con-
stitutional balance of power by ceding too much power to the Presi-
dent and diminishing the relative powers of the legislative and judi-
cial branches. 477  Thus, courts that apply the nationalist model
abdicate their constitutional responsibility to restrain illegal executive
action, thereby distorting the balance of power among the branches.
Finally, judicial application of the nationalist model harms the
United States' international reputation. U.S. violations of the VCCR
and the Geneva Conventions contribute to a growing perception that
the United States is hostile to international law. More specifically,
other countries accuse the United States of trying to develop an inter-
national system in which other states are constrained by international
law, but the United States is free to pursue its national interests, un-
fettered by the requirements of international law. Proponents of the
nationalist model may object that it is inappropriate for courts to con-
cern themselves with international perceptions of U.S. behavior.
That objection, though, merely serves to highlight the intellectual
gulf between the Marshall Court and modem nationalists. According
to a leading historical account, the Marshall Court's decisions mani-
fested "deep concern that the United States be known for its adher-
ence to international law and its respect for treaty obligations .... In
construing treaties of the Untied States, the Court exercised great lib-
erality in broadening the rights of the signatory powers and those
claiming under them.' '47 8 Modem courts would do well to follow
Chief Justice Marshall's transnationalist approach.
477. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600,
Congress has authorized the President to utilize military commissions similar to the ones that
the President initially tried to establish without congressional authorization. The fact of
congressional authorization clearly mitigates concerns about unchecked executive power in
this context. Nevertheless, the nationalist model is problematic because it encourages judges
to turn a blind eye to unlawful executive action.
478. HASKrNS & JOHNSON, supra note 267, at 557.
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